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Abstract
Conventional criticality-assessment methods drawn from the existing literature are
often limited to evaluations of scarcity risks, or rely on price as an indicator of criticality.
Such approaches, however, are ill-suited to a firm’s material procurement planning. A
simulation tool — the m:5 model — has been developed to model the behavior and
dynamics of materials markets. Grounded on economic theory, the model also draws
upon the characteristics of mining economics and market imperfections, while oﬀering
a flexible structure adaptable to diﬀerent markets and requiring few inputs. The m:5
model has been designed to enable manufacturers and policy-makers to compare the
outcomes of diﬀerent scenarios, informing decisions about material purchasing and
market regulation.
Model results illustrate common behaviors of materials markets viewed as critical,
such as those of Rare Earth Elements and Platinum Group Metals. Analyses illustrate
the interaction between demand growth rate and market concentration, as well as
the impact of price elasticity of demand on market behaviors. Moreover, an eﬀective
recycling stream is shown to be an eﬃcient policy to mitigate price excursions,
especially in the presence of disruptive events. A variety of potential private and
public mitigating policies are assessed in light of model results, to address common
risks encountered in critical materials markets. In addition, this thesis presents how
the model can be used to actually develop and compare such policies.
While the initial purposes of the model — namely, enabling scenario comparisons
and gaining qualitative insights on specific materials markets — has been fulfilled in
this work, future developments on the model could include the endogenous treatment
of recycling and adding price-responsiveness to the handling of stock, so as to refine
its correspondence to actual markets’ behaviors.
Thesis Supervisor: Frank R. Field, III
Title: Senior Research Engineer
Sociotechnical Systems Research Center
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the most important challenges facing any manufacturer is the need to carefully
plan for the procurement of the necessary materials, matching the resources on hand
with anticipated demand in a timely manner while limiting inventory or undersupply
costs. This planning task not only requires a careful estimation of the type and
quantity of materials required to meet demand, but also the assurance of a reliable
and cost-eﬀective source of supply for the planning horizon.
While the physical availability of materials plays a large role in production planning,
other factors ought to be taken into account: price and volatility, geopolitical situations
and regulations in producing countries as well as market concentration. All of these
concerns can have significant impacts on the costs of materials procurement.
When making production plans, manufacturers are confronted with multiple kinds
of uncertainties, stemming both from the demand- and the supply-side. Demand vari-
ations usually require that manufacturers maintain product and material inventories;
on the other hand, uncertainties in the supply of resources for production introduce
another important set of issues. For some classes of supply risks, conventional business
strategies and operational planning — such as contracting, hedging or stockpiling —
are usually suﬃcient to mitigate the risks to manufacturers. However, when uncertain-
ties aﬀect the long-term reliability of the supply or arise from fundamental structural
changes in supply or product technologies, the conventional economic understanding
is that markets will “naturally” lead to eﬃcient outcomes, provided that these mar-
kets are well regulated. For an individual firm, however, knowing that markets will
ultimately lead to an eﬃcient allocation is of little comfort when the consequences of
price excursions or supply disruptions will directly aﬀect the individual actors and
their ability to satisfy demand — and stay in business. It hence becomes desirable to
develop decision-tools that can help manufacturers better understand market dynamics
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and supply-related risks, as well as the impact of diﬀerent demand patterns on the
price of needed resources.
What types of tools, then, can be used to identify supply uncertainties, since those
uncertainties can have very diverse origins? In particular, firms typically rely upon
prices as their main signals to inform their production and operational decisions when
facing these uncertainties. This view derives from economic theories arguing that prices
represent the true social cost of a resource, under conventional market assumptions.
If the conditions of a perfect market hold, price should provide all the information
necessary for firms to make eﬃcient decisions. However, market imperfections, such
as externalities or structural ineﬃciencies, can bias prices’ accuracy in reflecting the
implicit value of a resource. This suggests that a manufacturer’s response to price
signals should be tempered by a better understanding of the nature and source of those
biases — for example, whether the price excursion derives from natural, geopolitical or
logistical influences. As a consequence, firms seek to develop other indicators that are
more finely tuned toward assessing the causes of price fluctuations, rather than relying
solely upon prices themselves. Such metrics — for instance, market concentration
indicators or depletion indexes — can be developed to assess diﬀerent types of risks,
as will be shown in this thesis. These metrics derive from models that have been
devised to develop a deeper understanding of the fundamental interactions between
supply and demand for a specific market, in order to better inform manufacturers
making purchasing decisions. It has been observed, however, that only a few — if any
— methods adopt an economist’s point of view in order to study materials markets
(Erdman and Graedel 2011).
This work presents a model that is grounded in economic theory and incorporates
knowledge about the mining industry to understand market dynamics and imperfec-
tions. The main focus of this thesis is the supply of materials and the implications
that public policies, market structures and demand scenarios have on production and
price, and ultimately on manufacturers.
The specific case of critical materials has been chosen in this study. Materials
characterized as “critical”, such as Rare Earth Elements (REEs) or precious metals, are
elements of the periodic table that fulfill specific functionalities diﬃcult to achieve using
other technologies, and whose supply and prices have been subjected to variability,
which dramatically aﬀects production costs. The increased demand for such materials,
particularly in manufacturing sectors such as the automotive industry or renewable
energy, has increased the risks of supply disruptions, and manufacturers are more and
more concerned about their availability.
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The fact that the markets for critical materials exhibit high volatility makes
them useful subjects for this sort of study — there is, therefore, a large number
of observations that can be tested. Moreover, the attention paid to these materials
markets means that considerable information, albeit collected after the fact, is available
to construct and validate modeling frameworks. The aim of this work is to use the
rich set of historical circumstances surrounding critical materials and illustrate how
a model such as the one that has been developed can help better understand the
influence of market dynamics on observed events.
The questions addressed in this thesis are the following: to what extent is it
feasible and beneficial to adopt an economist’s view to get new insights on materials
availability? In the context of critical materials, how can a better understanding of
market dynamics inform criticality assessments and risk-mitigating strategies?
First, this thesis seeks to develop a characterization of what materials criticality
means, and in particular confront current approaches to materials criticality with
regard to the needs of manufacturers and policy-makers. The modeling tool that
has been developed — the m:5 model — is then presented. It has been grounded
in economic theory, but also incorporates imperfections that are specific both to
mining and to “real world” markets in general. Chapter 3 will explain the model
and its assumptions, as well as compare it to existing modeling tools that have been
looking at materials availability. Finally, model results are presented to illustrate
how a dynamic approach to criticality enables better-informed decision-making when
considering material purchasing. Moreover, diﬀerent risk-mitigating policies, stemming
from model results, are assessed in the context of the observation of real-world markets.
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Chapter 2
Materials Criticality
This chapter introduces the notion of material criticality, which has been the context
of this research. The example of palladium, one of the six Platinum Group Metals
(PGMs), oﬀers an illustration of how criticality can manifests itself in a particular
economical context, and how a better understanding of sources of concern may lead to
the development of eﬃcient risk-mitigating strategies. Finally, existing approaches to
the question of materials availability are presented and assessed in light of the scope
of this research.
2.1 Introduction to the Notion of Criticality
This section addresses the question of materials criticality, and formalizes ways to
identify and characterize associated risks.
2.1.1 Definition and Presentation of Critical Materials
The topic of materials criticality has recently received attention largely because so-
called “critical” materials, such as rare earth elements (REEs) and platinum group
metals (PGMs), are of increasing importance for many diﬀerent sectors of the economy:
automotive, environmental, energy-related, high-technology etc. For instance, REEs
are used in permanent magnets to make wind turbines, and PGMs are essential in
catalytic converters needed to reduce car emissions. Recent studies have established a
list of critical elements that is shown on Figure 2-1.
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When speaking of a critical material, analysts are usually referring to a material
whose supply is constrained while demand is high, and whose market is global in
scope. These two conditions lead to high market volatility and a perception of
supply unreliability. The factors underlying these conditions, however, may vary
widely from a material to another. Sometimes materials criticality might derive from
geophysical scarcity, but criticality can also be the consequence of supply concentration
or a monopolistic situation that creates substantial market pressures. The resulting
uncertainty has a dramatic influence on the decision-making of manufacturers regarding
materials purchasing and design choices, and the consequences on the economy as a
whole can be great.
Figure 2-1: Critical elements according to recent studies (Jaﬀe et al. 2011; Bauer et al.
2011; Eggert et al. 2008) . In particular, PGMs are highlighted in yellow and REEs in
green.
The notion of criticality is context-dependent, reliant on the decision-maker’s
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need for the material of concern. In fact, most definitions speak of criticality as the
interaction between instability of supply and reliance upon supply. This characteri-
zation, however, does not provide specific actionable risk-mitigating strategies. This
thesis aims at developing ways to identify criticality risks, and ways of characteriz-
ing criticality that are better guide for appropriate action, once a criticality risk is
identified.
Criticality is traditionally associated with scarcity. This thesis argues that, despite
its context-dependency, there are formal criteria that can be used to establish and
classify a material’s criticality. More importantly, these criteria can serve as a guide
to the strategic responses most appropriate to the context out of which criticality
derives.
In particular, criticality is the consequence of a confluence of factors: (a) market
imperfections in either materials production or consumption, or both; (b) the influence
of non-primary market actors on the market, such as governments and investors;
(c) the fragility of the resource supply chain to “common mode” disruptions arising
from operating dislocations, either stochastic (e.g., natural disasters), organizational
(e.g., labor unrest) or institutional (e.g., non-competitive behavior of firms such
as cartelization); and (d) a relatively sparse set of feasible — or at least not cost-
prohibitive — alternative technologies to achieve comparable functionality using
diﬀerent materials.
Firms facing these circumstances run the risk of facing extraordinary market
volatility, both in terms of substantial price excursions and in terms of restrictions on
resource availability at any price, which may ultimately lead to firm failure.
2.1.2 Functionality Constraints: Manifestation of Criticality
from a User Perspective
When making design decisions, manufacturers seek to employ the least costly alter-
native that provides a given functionality, or alternatively choose the most eﬃcient
design under a cost threshold. This cost minimizing process leads decision-makers
to consider a range of materials that could satisfy the set of design parameters that
a product should fulfill. The concept of “demand for a material” is not meaningful
in itself, at the economic level — rather, it is the demand for its performance that
ultimately leads, in a complex fashion, to a derived demand for that material. This
thesis employs the notion of functionality to encompass this complex dependency
among the materials required, the technologies applied, and the resulting performance
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of a manufactured good.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the way in which cost and performance targets shape how
manufacturers make design choices. Performance thresholds are indicated by the
red dotted line on the figure, and designate an upper limit on acceptable cost and a
lower limit on acceptable performance. The figure represents the notion that design
alternatives that have a cost above the threshold while oﬀering a poor performance are
not desirable; conversely, the alternatives whose cost and performance are represented
by bundles in the green zone satisfy both conditions. Some technologies might also
satisfy only one of the two conditions, and will hence require a “trade-oﬀ”: a company
may elect to choose an alternative having desirable performance over higher (and less
desirable) costs, if no cheaper alternative yields desired levels of performance.
Performance
Co
st
Most desirable
Least desirable Trade-off performance
Trade-off cost
Figure 2-2: Space of possible design choices with cost and performance thresholds.
The need for rare earths in wind turbines for electricity generation exemplifies
the notion of functionality constraint. The eﬃciency of a wind generator is a strong
function of the magnetic field strength used in the generator, and the most eﬀective
magnets in current turbine designs rely upon rare earths magnets to produce these
high magnetic field strengths. Hence, it is not the element itself that is sought by a
wind turbine manufacturer, but rather its magnetic property. If an alternative existed
at a lower price with similar properties, manufacturers would buy that substitute
instead. In this case, because of the performance requirement and the absence of a
suitable alternative, REEs are the only materials that satisfy the functional constraint
at a feasible cost.
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Substitutes can be represented on the cost-performance matrix presented on
Figure 2-2. Selecting a material over another becomes a matter of choosing which
(performance–cost) bundle — represented as a black cross on the graph — is most
advantageous, in the sense that it aﬀords the producer the highest profitability as well
as provides the market a good that is attractive enough in terms of performance and
social cost. In the case of critical materials however, the set of alternatives can be more
limited and constrained in specific ways that lead to criticality. In a case where the
supply for a specific material is unreliable for instance, its price may be subject to high
volatility, hence making the optimization process more challenging. More importantly,
the set of alternatives may not be as abundant as it is for a non-critical material; in
particular, the functionality constraints might be predominant — in the case of REEs
for permanent magnets for instance — and hence no other known material could fulfill
the performance requirements.
Manufacturers need to account for criticality when making design and purchasing
decisions, because supply risks and price volatility greatly influence the market’s
perception of availability. Failure to consider criticality might lead to situations, as
in the case of palladium presented in Section 2.2, where historic price levels do not
incorporate the notion that the supply for that material is constrained — for instance
the market is highly concentrated — and that this may lead to disruptive events such
as supply shortages or price excursions.
2.1.3 The Structure–Conduct–Performance Paradigm Applied
to Critical Materials Markets
As stressed in previous sections, critical elements can be of high importance to the
economy as whole. In addition to market actors — in particular material producers
and manufacturers — other stakeholders may also have a large interest in the stability
of the market. As a result, not only do materials markets influence a large number
of stakeholders, but there can also be external influences on the market, exerted by
actors outside the market, including governments.
The diﬀerent markets for critical elements share common structural characteristics.
In order to study the diﬀerent interactions taking place in such markets, this section
has adapted the Structure–Conduct–Performance Paradigm developed by Scherer and
Ross (1990) to the critical material industry case. Figure 2-3 illustrates the diﬀerent
forces that take place in the industry.
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Figure 2-3: The major components framing of the political economy of a materials
market, resulting from the Structure–Performance–Conduct paradigm. In particular,
the arrows depict the ways in which the presented sectors influence one another.
The four main components of this framework are the market structure, conduct
and performance, as well as government policy1. The arrows on Figure 2-3 represent
the influences exerted by the diﬀerent blocks on each other, which will be described in
this section.
The broad definitions of each of the four components are summarized below:
Market Structure encompasses the architecture of the market: the number (and
concentration) of sellers and buyers, the barriers to entry (often very high in the
case of critical minerals since the mining industry is highly capital-intensive),
and the cost structures of the diﬀerent suppliers and consumers — i.e. the
individual supply and demand curves.
Market Conduct can be described, in the case of the mining industry, with firm
pricing behavior, the potential for lobbying within the industry, as well as other
structural components influencing the ways in which the market can behave —
the notion of competitive advantage of diﬀerent countries, for instance.
Market Performance can be described with the total materials production and the
observation of whether the market operates at the point of allocative eﬃciency
(i.e. where marginal cost is equal to marginal benefit). Price volatility, sup-
ply reliability and supply constancy are good indicators to assess the overall
performance of the market.
1One could also include the basic conditions of the market — namely the description of supply
and demand general characteristics, such as the physical constraints surrounding the material or the
price elasticity of demand. The scope of this study however is limited to the four main components
of the paradigm.
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Government Policy in the case of materials markets can take the form of taxes and
subsidies, international trade regulations, mining and environmental regulations,
controls on the price of the commodities, or regulations against antitrust as well
as mandatory disclosure of information.
Because critical elements are important to a wide array of actors, the interactions
among these four components will be large in number and diverse in their influence.
Mapping them aﬀords certain insights into the behavior of these markets.
Market Structure::Market Conduct The supply market for mineable materials
is generally highly concentrated — REEs are perhaps the most striking example,
since 97% of the global supply is mined in China. Moreover, barriers to entry
are very high in the mining industry, largely because of high investment costs
and physical constraints. Monopoly or oligopoly may hence arise and lead to
non-competitive market behaviors. The monopolistic situation of China for
REEs mining has given the country very strong bargaining powers, and the
recent REE “crises” — in particular the setting of quotas and disruptions in the
supply (Bradsher 2010) — have arisen because of this inherent ineﬃciency in
the market structure. On the other hand, a concentrated demand side can lead
to monopsony or oligopsony situations where a narrow sector dominates market
demand. This can potentially increase the risk of lobbying by the main demand
sector. Finally, extraction, refining and parts of the manufacturing phase can be
vertically integrated for certain materials — it has recently become the case for
the permanent magnet industry using REEs for instance. The bargaining power
of one market actor may hence significantly increase and shift his behavior away
from what would be expected in a competitive market.
Conversely, the conduct on the market may also have an impact on the structure:
demand sectors might drop out, or suppliers leave the market because of an
aggressive pricing strategy that can be adopted by others. Again, the case
of REEs is striking: the monopoly situation observed until today mainly rose
because other actors were driven out of business around 1985 when China
increased its supply very significantly and drove prices down (Hurst 2010).
Government Policy::Market Structure Public policies may have a direct impact
on the market structure, and this by diﬀerent means. On the one hand, a material
can be strategic to a government because of potential security implications; as a
result, the government itself may become a consumer and directly change the
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structure of demand. On the other hand, policies can alter the very structure of
the supply. First, governments can put in place antitrust regulations; in the case
of critical materials however, this lever can be limited in that the sometimes
highly concentrated situations on the market are due to either physical limitations
or the high financial barriers to entry. Governments may also have an incentive
to provide financial benefits to potential new entrants — via the use of subsidies
or specific taxation regimes for instance — and hence encourage the development
of new mines that can alleviate the concentration of supply. Finally, governments
might be able to sanction reproved supply practices by regulating the sources
of supply. The Dodd-Frank Act indeed requires all American manufacturers to
report any use of one of the 3TG materials (tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold)
emanating from the Democratic Republic of Congo in its “Conflict Minerals”
Rule (Dodd-Frank Act (2010)).
Government Policy::Market Conduct Diﬀerent types of policy tools can be used
by governments to regulate critical materials markets and change their actors’
behavior. One type of actions is the implementation of price controls; govern-
ments may choose to either set a floor or a ceiling on the commodity price if
they have suﬃcient authority, or to subsidize partly for the cost if the material
is deemed of high importance for national economy. Mining regulations may
also be put in place so as to limit unreasonably high extraction rates that have a
negative impact on (a) the environment, (b) the labor force and (c) other actors
on the market that cannot operate at such high extraction rates. Public policies
can also tackle the question of asymmetric information on the market, which is
a source of imperfections, and reduce this asymmetry by mandating information
disclosures by suppliers — either directly or inferred through data collected from
the firms comprising the overall industrial sector. Finally, regulations can be
influenced by market actors who may benefit from a regulated environment, since
they are usually better organized and have a greater influence on the political
aspects of the economy. This can however weaken the eﬃciency of the markets,
because of possible regulatory capture by private actors (Stigler 1971).
Market Conduct::Market Performance According to economic theory, the key
conditions of a perfectly competitive market are that information is perfect, that
actors behave rationally and homogeneously, and that there are no frictions
or transaction costs. Under these conditions, the market-clearing price should
reflect the intrinsic economic value of the resource. As pointed out earlier, some
market behaviors in the case of critical materials may lead to ineﬃciencies and
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violate the assumptions of a perfectly competitive marketplace. The ineﬃciencies
that then arise — whether from the nature of the market, from the market
conditions specific to the material, or from external events such as conflicts — can
have an impact on the overall performance of the market. Events such as supply
disruptions, price volatility, or negative externalities, are direct consequences of
those imperfections and can have dramatic impacts on the economy.
The market for critical materials presents systemic characteristics and ineﬃciencies
that make the supply chain for the resource vulnerable to risks such as supply disruption
or high price volatility.
2.2 Illustration of the Concept of Criticality: the Ex-
ample of Palladium
One of the most acute market imperfections for critical materials is the incompleteness
of information. The supply for critical materials is concentrated in a limited number
of countries, while their market is very often global. Concentration gives supplying
countries additional bargaining power at the international level and increases the
dependence of importing nations on the information coming from a limited number
of major actors. Manufacturers have to plan their expected consumption for the
upcoming year and order an adequate quantity from the exporting countries. Contracts
(short- or long-term, depending on the producing countries) can be established, but
supply disruptions are possible. Furthermore, the global demand for one material
in a year can be challenging to estimate for market strategists, since it depends on
technological changes, new regulations — such as CAFE standards that raise the
need for PGMs in catalytic converters — investors, price etc. The incompleteness of
information — and in particular the asymmetry of information concerning the supply
the limited understanding of mine operations and deposits by manufacturers — leads
to ineﬃciencies on the market.
Palladium, one of the six PGMs, is an interesting example of critical material. In
particular, the “Palladium Crisis” of 1998 provides a good illustration of a specific
aspect of criticality, namely that of asymmetry of information perpetrated by an actor
of the supply duopoly for the material, combined with an unprecedented increase in
demand.
The following sections use the palladium case to illustrate how ‘criticality’ should
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be studied specifically in order to identify the diﬀerent causes and interactions that
led to a critical market.
2.2.1 The “Palladium Crisis”: Origin and Implications
Figure 2-4 illustrates the fact that palladium prices have historically been lower
than platinum prices. As a result, car manufacturers progressively changed the
design and PGM formulation of catalytic converters in order to use more of the less
expensive palladium as a platinum substitute (both PGMs have similar catalytic
properties, although platinum is not fully substitutable). Moreover, around 1997,
car manufacturers agreed to more stringent emission standards, leading to further
significant increases in their use of palladium in their fleets.
Figure 2-4: Historical prices for palladium and platinum. Source: Kitco.
Yet that year Russia, the leading palladium exporting country (representing about
46% of the global supply), decided to freeze exports until early spring. The resulting
supply shortfall created high tensions on the market and initiated a price increase. The
following year, the Russian government imposed export limits again, this time until
summer. Manufacturers — automakers in particular — increased their demand for
the metal, in order to mitigate the risk of disruption in the future, and consequently
accumulated stocks of excess palladium. Speculation further increased market pressure,
and prices rose.
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When the anticipated supply disruption did not take place and demand shifted
away from palladium — some industries managed to reduce their demand by design
changes that proved very costly — the price of palladium dropped abruptly and
manufacturers with large inventories of unused palladium incurred major losses. To
give a sense of the magnitude of these losses, one major US car manufacturer lost
over one billion dollars during that crisis — and on average, less than an ounce of
palladium is used in a car.
This crisis illustrates how the combination of diﬀerent events made palladium
particularly critical:
On the one hand, expectations of actors were not met, in that the past proved
insuﬃcient to inform the future behavior of the market. Indeed, the demand for
palladium increased significantly around that time, mainly due to the early and rapid
adoption of stringent new emission regulations by car manufacturers that expected
palladium supply to be abundant enough to meet their needs — as had always been
the case by the past. When the Russian government cut the supply, the demand could
not be met, the other sources of supply (mainly South African and North American
less significantly) proved insuﬃcient to sustain the surge in demand, leading prices to
rise.
On the other hand, there was a significant asymmetry of information concerning
the Russian supply.
The first manifestation of it came from the quotas set by the government. It
should be noted that all of the Russian primary PGMs supply comes from the Norilsk
nickel mine (of which PGMs are byproducts). Furthermore, all the exports have to
be processed through Almazjuvelirexport, a federal state-owned unitary enterprise,
exporting precious metals on a commission basis. The supply cuts that occurred in
1997 and 1998 had been publicly justified as resulting from paperwork processing
issues within the governmental instances. The government hence played an important
role in the supply disruptions that occurred at that time and did not provide suﬃcient
and accurate information about the quotas that had been set — in a timely fashion
for decision-makers to make informed purchasing decisions.
The second very important source of incomplete information in the case of the
Russian palladium supply is the existence of a strategic stock in Russia. In the 1970s
and 1980s, during the Cold War, a lot of palladium had been extracted in the nickel
mine. Yet at the time, the demand for palladium was very slim and trading that
precious metal only seemed secondary in the eyes of the soviet government. As a result,
important quantities of that material got piled up in national reserves and remained
there under state secrecy until the growing need for palladium provided an incentive to
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the Russian government to start trading that stock. In the years preceding the crisis,
palladium had been flowing out of that stock as well in order to meet growing export
requirements. But the quantity remaining in that stock had always been treated as
a very important state secret, and manufacturers importing Russian palladium did
not know exactly how much metal was left . Hence, purchasing teams were planning
their import quantities based on the supply from previous years and accounting for
the strategic stock to fulfill their needs. This lack of information and transparency
from Russia only further increased the negative eﬀects of the crisis, and speculators
used it in order to deepen the pressure on the market and palladium prices.
In this case, criticality arose because of the combination of diﬀerent factors. First,
the historical demand data was not suﬃcient to inform future consumption because of
radical changes in the automotive industry that led to a significantly higher reliance on
palladium. Second, uncertainty surrounded the Russian exports, since the government
set export quotas and the magnitude of the stock remained (and still is today) unknown.
This asymmetry of information became egregious because Russia was responsible for
a large part of the global supply.
Uncertainty surrounding both supply and demand, led to very high price volatility,
market instability — worsened by investors — and ultimately encouraged the devel-
opment of North American mines (Stillwater in particular) so as to ease the market
concentration.
2.2.2 Risk-Mitigating Policies that were Implemented at the
Time
On the one hand, palladium consumers implemented diﬀerent policies to mitigate the
risks and the impacts on the market.
First, manufacturers decided to stockpile when Russia announced supply disrup-
tions. This policy turned out to be very harmful because that stock was constituted
when the price was rising, but it quickly fell at its original level, hence significantly
devaluating the investment made by the manufacturers.
Then design choices were made so as to move away from palladium as quickly
as possible; some car manufacturers developed very expensive new design strategies
to be able to meet newly established stringent regulation standards without using
as much palladium. Similarly, electronics companies tried to reduce the amount of
palladium used. Because the decisions were made very rapidly and changes had to
be implemented sometimes in less than a one-year period, these changes were very
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expensive to implement.
Achieving increased recovery and recycling of palladium might have been an eﬃcient
policy, since a secondary source of supply tends to mitigate supply disruption risks.
However, that could not be put into place at that time because the widespread use of
palladium in car was a very recent development. Without a stock of obsolete product
from which to extract material, there was no palladium to recycle.
The supply side also put diﬀerent policies into place. In 1999, the Russian
government authorized long-term contracts (10 years) with automakers in order to
ease the market panic, and lifted the quotas on primary exports. Exports from the
stock had to be individually reviewed, but that measure eased the market to a certain
extent. Finally, investors decided to expand the Stillwater mine, while other sources
of supply emerged (in Canada and Zimbabwe), reducing market concentration via a
“natural” market structural change.
2.2.3 Proposed Policy Options to Lower the Impact of Infor-
mation Asymmetry on the Market
The market for critical materials, and palladium in particular, typically owes its
concentration to natural causes: not every material can be economically extracted
everywhere, and opening a mine represents a massive investment. As a result, first-
movers and countries where a material is particularly abundant and easily mineable
have a definite strategic advantage. Russia is a major player in the market for
palladium, and hence greatly influences it. The Russian government has had a strong
influence on the treatment of palladium exports, which has increased the asymmetry
of information concerning quota setting as well as quantity of stock remaining. Indeed,
all exports have to go through one state-owned company and every transaction has
to be approved by the government. Moreover, the paperwork and export approvals
required to unfreeze the Russian supply were a very good example of what Allison
(1969) qualifies as organizational ineﬃciencies: the government had to follow the pre-
established the “standard operating procedures” despite the exceptional circumstances
created by an increase in demand, which limited the choices and hence the strategies
that could be adopted. Other governments cannot intervene to directly reduce the
information asymmetry however — especially because Russia was not in the WTO
at the time (it entered in August 2012) hence limiting the bargaining power of the
international community.
Diﬀerent public policies can be considered in order to mitigate the risk created
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by the asymmetry of information. The first one is aimed at reducing the information
asymmetry by gaining more control over supply information; this can be accomplished
by the opening of a new mine — if the reserves exist — in an importing country, since
possessing a domestic source of an expensive commodity can prove very strategic. This
is what happened in the United States with a significant expansion of the Stillwater
mine under a federal mining law that provides subsidies for purchasing of public land.
The main drawback of this policy is the very high upfront cost it requires — not
necessarily by the government, but by the investors building the mine. Hence it is not
always a feasible option. Another way to accomplish that same goal yet to a lesser
extent could be through the investment in an existing mine that would not have to be
domestic, hence providing a greater control on the operations of the mine. It would be
challenging to implement since mining countries may not accept other governments’
investments, but could potentially be accomplished by private companies.
Another type of policy would be the creation of a federal stock of the materials
deemed strategic. Of course, with this policy come the drawbacks of the risky
investments and it can be seen as an overregulation of which the costs might exceed
the benefits, if the investment proves hazardous.
One could also envision the negotiation of governmental contracts for the regulation
of imports/exports that could act as insurance policies for domestic manufacturers
in need of a critical material. Yet such a policy would require an important amount
of coordination amongst the nations, which could be problematic in cases similar to
the one we just studied where it seemed that coordination was lacking even within
the Russian government to get the diﬀerent approvals. Moreover, one could argue
that such an insurance policy would be risky for a government to take on, and should
be implemented only if the material impacts industries that have a strategic role in
the domestic economy. The strategic importance of PGMs and the impact it has on
several industries — including high-technology industry — could lead governments
to, in fact, take action. It could however increase the risk of a Stiglerian regulatory
capture (Stigler 1971) by industries that are in need of a specific material, since those
interest groups would benefit from regulations favoring their own industry through
subsidized raw products, as compared to others that may not need the same materials.
Finally, asymmetry of information could be eased by structures in charge of
monitoring extraction and demand evolutions. Certain organizations, such as Johnson
Matthey for PGMs or the United States Geological Survey (USGS), publish periodical
reports and data about the state of the market of various materials. Yet these reports
usually provide a short-term outlook on both production and demand, which does
not provide suﬃcient information for decision-makers to make purchasing decisions in
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a timely fashion. It would hence be beneficial to have an international third-party
organization that publishes comprehensive reports with longer-term considerations to
help industries make decisions about materials.
Asymmetry of information in the context of extraction of critical materials is
an important source of market failure; mitigating that risk can prove challenging
when the supply is controlled by the government of main suppliers. However some
public policies can be put in place within importing nations so as to limit the impacts
on manufacturers and, were the mines not directly controlled by the government,
policies within mining countries could be implemented in order to maintain minimum
contractual exports, which could be supported by the WTO for instance. In any case,
appropriate risk-assessment should be developed.
The example of palladium, and more specifically of the 1998 “Palladium Crisis”, is
an illustration of a specific case of criticality. Indeed, palladium became critical around
that time because of an increased demand — fostered by the automotive industry and
tightened emission regulations — as well as a complex and uncertain supply stream
emanating mainly from Russia. This example hence illustrates a specific aspect of
what we previously defined as materials criticality.
2.3 A Review of Existing Approaches to the Ques-
tion of Criticality
The notion of criticality has been formally addressed only recently (Erdman and
Graedel 2011) — resource scarcity had been widely studied in the past, but the notion
that factors other than depletion can aﬀect the reliability of materials’ supply has
only emerged recently, with the manifestation of large economic crises such as the one
presented in Section 2.2.
This section will present an overview of existing criticality-assessment methods,
and illustrate where this work adds to the existing body of methods.
2.3.1 Past Work on Material Criticality
General Considerations
The notion of criticality is diﬃcult to formalize, since, as mentioned earlier, it is very
subjective; however existing approaches agree on a fundamental issue, namely the fact
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that criticality is a manifestation of a supply risk and of a vulnerability to this risk
(Graedel et al. 2011; Bauer et al. 2011; Jaﬀe et al. 2011).
The question of supply risk is now widely recognized as not limited only to scarcity
(as mentioned in the report Critical Raw Materials for the EU 2010). Instead, other
considerations (such as geopolitical risks or sustainability concerns, as presented by
Graedel et al. 2011) are often mentioned when assessing the question of supply risks
comprehensively. The sources of concern that are highlighted in recent works can be
very diverse: including relative physical availability (often evaluated by the USGS2),
feasibility of extraction, regulations and societal characteristics of producing countries
(Graedel et al. 2011, mentions the Human Development Index for instance), and
geopolitical considerations that can be measured using metrics such as the HHI3. Most
approaches tackle the issue of supply risk assessment through the construction and
use of metrics, presented in the next section.
Another important notion for criticality is that of the “functionality constraints”
that we mentioned in Section 2.1, or vulnerability to risk. This notion is often
addressed by defining the scope of the study, and in particular by specifying who the
stakeholder is and what his specific current or projected demand for the material is —
the scope is determinant in deciding which materials are critical and which are not
(Erdman and Graedel 2011). The question of materials substitutability is also very
important for manufacturers, since it directly feeds into the design decision-making
process, and is hence helps to establish the demand-related risks of a material. Another
important aspect of demand risks is the structure of the demand — more specifically,
the concentration of demand sectors, and the resulting market power of suppliers over
a specific decision-maker.
Finally, the notion of time dependency of criticality assessment is cited as an
important consideration (in the report Bauer et al. 2011, for instance). A critical
assessment has indeed a short ‘lifetime’, since the context in which it is established
is subject to evolving influences. Therefore, criticality assessment must be regularly
updated to reflect changing market contexts.
2United States Geological Survey, a scientific American agency that study among others natural
resources
3The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index that measures the relative competition of firms in a market by
comparing individual sizes to the industry as a whole, and defined in the following section.
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Metrics-Based Approaches
A large portion of the literature on criticality relies on the use of metrics, to assess the
criticality risks presented by a specific material. In these analyses, the decision-maker
collects relevant data and computes diﬀerent numerical indicators that indicate to
what extent a particular aspect of the market presents a risk.
One of the particularities of such approaches is the ease of computation, since the
data necessary to calculate such metrics can be found in publicly available sources,
such as the annual reports of mining operations or surveys such as the United States
Geological Survey (USGS). Another type of resource can be annual overviews of a
specific market by private consulting firms — for instance Johnson Matthey for PGMs.
Moreover, a decision-maker can easily refine such a risk assessment to his require-
ments by choosing the metrics that are most relevant to his activity and need, as well
as setting the appropriate thresholds that lead to declaring that the material is critical
for his firm, or not. This degree of customization makes a metrics-based criticality
assessment particularly flexible, as well as quick.
Examples of metrics that are often cited and used are listed below:
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of the relative concentration of either
the supply or the demand and that can be expressed as a percentage. It is
defined as
HHI =
NX
i=1
x2i
where xi is the fraction of the total supply (or demand) the i-th supplier (or
consumer) is responsible for, and N the number of actors currently on the
market. Agencies commonly consider markets whose index is below 15% to
be non-concentrated, between 15 and 25% to be moderately concentrated, and
above 25% to be highly concentrated (refer for instance to DoJ 2010).
Exponential Index of Depletion expressed in years, and introduced by Meadows
et al. (1972), is the time it would take to consume the supply at a constant
exponential growth rate of consumption. It assumes in particular that discovery
and recycling rates are negligible. The formula is
y =
1
⇢
·
✓
1 + ⇢ · R
C0
◆
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with y the number of years of consumption left at the constant rate ⇢, R the
reserve left of the material and C0 the annual consumption during the initial
year.
Recycling Rate is the percentage representing the amour of material that can be
recovered in terms of material consumed. More specifically,
r =
scrap consumption
total consumption
Other metrics can be evaluated to assess scarcity, price volatility, cost of substitution
etc. Alonso (2010, Section 4.2, pp 59–63) provides metrics of interest to evaluate
material availability.
Existing Models Addressing the Issue of Materials Availability
Another type of criticality assessment focuses on the question of materials availability,
taking a more “dynamic” approach than metrics. Diﬀerent types of models have been
devised to understand and assess the behavior of materials markets, the most notable
being analytical models based on economic abstraction, econometrics models using
financial data, and simulation tools such as system dynamics models.
The complexity of materials markets make this modeling task challenging — es-
pecially because of market deviations from ideal, theoretical behavior. As a result,
a decision-maker may choose a certain model that satisfies his own “performance-to-
eﬀort” ratio requirements, since adding complexity to a model requires additional
eﬀort and time. The key aspect of those model-based approaches is, thus, the proper
assessment of what insights are desired and what level of precision should be achieved
in order to fulfill these requirements.
Section 3.3 will delve into greater detail to explain what each of these methods
comprise, and what type of insights can be gained from their use.
2.3.2 An Example of a Metrics-Based Framework to Assess
Criticality
This section provides the example of a metrics-based approach that has been developed
at the Materials Systems Laboratory at MIT by Elisa Alonso et al. that has been
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applied during this research work in order to quickly evaluate the criticality of diﬀerent
materials for a manufacturer.
Five main sources of risk — both on the supply- and the demand-side — have been
identified, and provide a comprehensive outlook on a material. The potential areas
of concern evaluated for each material are shown on Figure 2-5: physical constraints,
institutional ineﬃciencies, sustainability impacts, relative importance to the industry
and importance to the company. The following section will describe each category in
greater detail.
Figure 2-5: Schematic representation of the developed criticality-assessment framework.
The five factors represented here, namely physical constraints, institutional ineﬃcien-
cies, sustainability impacts, relative importance to the industry and importance to the
company, have been identified as the main sources of risk employed in this particular
form of metrics-based criticality analysis.
Assessment of Supply Risks
Physical constraints First, physical constraints associated with the material are
evaluated. This component of the analysis looks at considerations such as the
crustal abundance of the material and the amount of energy required to extract
it — both of which have an impact on production cost and ultimately on which
actors can enter the market. Another important aspect is the question of whether
the material is a by-product of another resource or if it is a primary material,
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since production economics can also be significantly influenced by the market of
co-products, which further complicates the risk-assessment.
Diﬀerent metrics can be developed to assess such characteristics (Alonso 2010),
including the static and exponential depletion indexes (Meadows et al. 1972),
and relative rates of discovery and extraction (Malthus 1798; Gordon, Bertram,
and Graedel 2006).
Institutional ineﬃciencies Another important factor in criticality assessment is
the notion of institutional ineﬃciencies. These include the question of supply
concentration as well as the diﬀerent geopolitical risks of the producing countries.
Indeed, a supply disruption can occur without a physical shortage of a material,
but rather because of a conflict or strikes, for instance. A recent example is
the case of platinum, where strikes by South African miners have disrupted
the production for several months (see for instance the USGS report by Yager,
Soto-Viruet, and Barry 2012).
Again, metrics can be developed to assess such risks. An important one is the
HHI described in Section 2.3.1. In particular, higher values of this index indicate
a higher market concentration, and possibly a higher risk of disruptive events for
price and supply. Another consideration is the distribution of reserves among
countries (Chapman and Roberts 1983). In particular, a greater concentration
of reserves leads to greater production concentration and hence increases the
risk of institutional ineﬃciency.
Sustainability impacts This last supply-related area of concern seeks to embed
sustainability concerns in the evaluation. Critical materials typically are non-
renewable mineable resources; as a result, issues of sustainable use can become
important since unsustainable practices (whether perceived or actual) can po-
tentially exacerbate or mitigate supply disruption risks.
One example of the influence of sustainable practice upon criticality is recycling.
Some materials, such as precious metals in catalytic converters, can be recovered
and, after processing, reused; if a recycling stream is properly set up, this creates a
secondary source of supply (usually available at prices lower than virgin material)
that can help mitigate primary supply risks. Similarly, a material’s carbon
footprint can be an interesting metric of sustainability because of environmental
regulations that can constrain manufacturers. Finally, certain materials are
classified as “conflict minerals” by section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010).
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The concerns raised by the so-called conflict minerals (namely tin, tungsten,
tantalum and gold) are due to their mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
In particular, their retailing price is significantly lower than the ‘social cost’ of
the resource because the workers are paid largely below a living wage. Moreover,
the revenues of the mining are used towards financing armed movements, and
there is a high risk premium associated with this supply. These reduced prices
ultimately lead to market disruptions that upset the “socially eﬃcient extraction
rates” as well as promote human misery by sustaining conflicts and encouraging
abusive mining conditions.
As with the preceding indicators, metrics can be used to help quantify contribu-
tion of sustainability to the criticality assessment. For example, the recycling
rate of a material, paired with the lifetime of products using this material and
life-cycle assessments, can be used to construct indicators of resource sustain-
ability or eﬃciency. Other metrics of interest are the water-use of the mining
process, as well as the carbon footprint of the material production.
Assessment of Risks on the Demand Side
The notion of criticality is inherently subjective, and dependent upon the decision-
maker and his strategic intent. While supply risks are common because of the existence
of a market, demand risks are assessed based on the user’s activity, which is illustrated
below.
Relative importance of the industry First, it is important to assess the current
demand landscape, in order to understand where the demand for a material
comes from and what the characteristics of the diﬀerent sectors are, such as the
growth rates, elasticities — to understand the impact of changes in price on the
demand of the sector — as well as recycling rates undertaken by the diﬀerent
industries. The relative importance of the decision-maker’s sector within the
whole demand landscape, as well as the potential existence of high elasticity
sectors that can act as “buﬀers” when price peaks, can also influence the firm’s
decision.
Once again, the HHI index can be used to assess the concentration of the market,
this time from a demand perspective. Indeed, the formula presented in 2.3.1
can be applied to demand sectors, with xi the fraction (in %) of the total
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consumption that is initiated by the i-th demand sector. Mono- or oligopsonistic
markets are more vulnerable to changes in demand, and hence more subject to
price volatility (Alonso 2010).
Importance to the company Finally, a specific firm should assess its current and
projected need for a material. This assessment can also be a valuable basis
for comparing a firm’s competitive position with others, since the eﬀect of a
price excursion or a supply disruption will diﬀerentially disadvantage the more
dependent competitor.
Application of the Framework to the Example of Palladium
In order to demonstrate the application of the aforementioned framework, the viewpoint
of a car manufacturer is presented as an example, examining the criticality risks deriving
from the use of precious metals in vehicle catalytic converters. The data used comes
from publicly available sources (see, for instance, the regularly updated USGS section
for PGMs; see also Johnson Matthey Market Data).
Physical constraints Like the other PGMs, palladium is one of the most expensive
materials by weight, since it is only found in low concentrations and requires
substantial amounts of energy to extract. Its price is thus particularly susceptible
to changes in energy costs. Moreover, palladium is often a by-product, either
from platinum extraction in South Africa, or in the Russian nickel extraction by
Norilsk. Finally, according to 2009 data from the USGS, the static depletion
index for palladium is of 364 years.
Institutional ineﬃciencies In 2012, about 43.5% of the production of palladium
was Russian, 36.5% was South African, 13.5% came from North American mines,
4% from Zimbabwe and 2.5% from other sources4. The resulting supply HHI
can hence be computed:
HHI(2012)Pd = 0.435
2 + 0.3652 + 0.1352 + 0.042 + 0.0252 = 34.3% > 25%
The supply for palladium is hence highly concentrated, according to the common
norms for the HHI (DoJ 2010).
4Source: Johnson Matthey Market Data
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As mentioned in Section 2.2, this high concentration as well as the Russian
geopolitical landscape have led to supply disruption and high price volatility in
the past. Moreover, recent strikes in South Africa have added pressure on the
market5.
Sustainability impacts Russia mainly relies on nuclear, hydropower and natural
gas to produce its electricity; however, given the high energy needed to extract
palladium, as well as South Africa’s reliance on coal-powered electricity gen-
eration, the palladium’s carbon footprint is very large. Recycling mitigates
this footprint somewhat, especially because the recycling of palladium is fairly
eﬃcient and well-established. Moreover, its use in catalytic converters also helps
reducing NOx and CO2. Finally, palladium does not pose significant conflict
mineral risks.
Relative importance of the industry Recent growth in car sales in Europe and
South America has driven up the palladium demand for 2011 (a 6% increase).
Moreover, the increasing Asian production of gasoline vehicles is a major influence
on palladium’s prices. Although the demand for palladium in the chemical and
electrical industries has risen, the automotive industry still constitutes the
main demand driver for this metal. Jewelry demand is forecast to decrease as
palladium prices rise, acting as a “buﬀer” sector to a certain extent, and hence
lowering the impact of price excursions or other supply disruptions on other
demand sectors.
This cursory criticality assessment, based on metrics and qualitative data, and to
be completed with the specific needs of a given manufacturer, illustrates the criticality
of palladium as a material used massively in the automotive industry as well as in
other sectors.
While the resulting risk-profile for palladium is useful to quickly realize that
palladium can, indeed, be critical if the firm’s demand for that resource is significant,
the scope of this assessment is limited, since only static measures are considered. In
particular, devising well-informed mitigation strategies can be challenging with only
metrics-based considerations. Section 2.3.3 below addresses in greater details the
general limitation of metrics-based approaches, such as the one presented here.
5A report on the impact of the strikes on the PGM industry has been published by the USGS
(Yager, Soto-Viruet, and Barry 2012). An interesting analysis focused on palladium has also been
published by Thomson Reuters GFMS (2013).
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2.3.3 Addressing the Gaps in the Current Approaches to Crit-
icality
Limitations of Static Approaches
The metrics-based approaches present the very significant advantage of being easily
computable, easy to compare, as well as requiring a limited amount of data. However,
they present several drawbacks that reduce their eﬃciency at comprehensively assessing
materials’ criticality.
First, metrics are inherently static. Some metrics may include a dynamic aspect
by considering several years and including discount rate considerations, such as the
dynamic depletion index. Nevertheless, metrics can only be evaluated at one point
in time and hence cannot capture the existing complex interactions among supply,
demand, and price. Section 4.2 will provide examples of situations when static metrics
approaches are limited, and when the use of a dynamic approach such as a model can
help better inform a decision-maker about the market.
In addition, the use of metrics requires a decision-maker to decide (a) what metrics
to use and (b) where to set the thresholds to establish that a material is critical.
It is incumbent on the decision-maker to make such “judgment calls”, which can
be diﬃcult to make consistently. Moreover, changes in market circumstances may
require the establishment of new thresholds, or the use of diﬀerent metrics. As a
result, metrics-based approaches may need constant revision, not only to modify the
context as for other criticality-assessment methods, but also to adjust the framework
itself. Moreover, metrics may not be suﬃcient to comprehensively understand market
dynamics and resulting risks.
Limitations of Existing Modeling Approaches
Section 3.3 will provide a more detailed overview of the limitations of existing modeling
approaches, but the main issues are that most of the tools developed are either too
data- and resource-intensive — especially system dynamics tools — or use an economic
abstraction that neither accounts for market imperfections, nor provide the short-term
vision that may be required by manufacturers.
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Proposed Method to Address These Concerns
Metrics are a quick and easily computable way of assessing materials criticality, by
evaluating the extent to which a material presents a given risk. Yet such approach is
inherently static and ignores market dynamics that can take place and exacerbate or
mitigate risks that would be harmful to a manufacturer.
While modeling tools are inherently limited in that they cannot fully replicate
reality and might be extremely resource-intensive, they can address many of the
limitations of metrics-based approaches. They can at a minimum be used to augment
and complement these analyses by aﬀording further insights. The question arises of
the trade-oﬀ between the amount of eﬀort required to build the modeling tool and the
quality of insight that can be extracted from its use. Depending on a decision-maker’s
needs and the scope of his criticality study, diﬀerent models may be favored over others.
Yet it is not always straightforward to assess the criticality of multiple materials, since
it may require a large amount of eﬀort.
Based on those considerations, this work proposes a two-tiered approach to the
assessment of materials criticality and the development of risk-mitigating policies that
can be implemented by a decision-maker.
- First, a risk-profile of the material can be easily developed by using a framework
similar to the one described in the section 2.3.2. This will enable the decision-
maker to quickly assess, with the use of publicly available data, whether or not
a material presents a potential risk to his activity.
- Then, if the risk is deemed significant, a market model has been designed to
(a) use economics theory to understand market dynamics, (b) incorporate market
imperfections that will improve the realism of the model and (c) use only a
limited amount of data and be suﬃciently flexible, in order to be applicable to
diﬀerent materials. The tool has been built in particular to make it easy for its
user to compare diﬀerent scenarios.
The following chapter presents the modeling tool that has been developed to
answer the need for such a modeling tool, which addresses the diﬀerent concerns of
metrics-based approaches and adds to the existing modeling approaches.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter introduces the modeling tool that has been developed in order to tackle the
question of materials criticality while taking market dynamics into account. This tool,
the Materials Mining Market Model for Manufacturers (or m:5) has been grounded
in economic theory, but also incorporates the knowledge we have of mining markets
and, in particular, accounts for some types of market imperfections. Moreover, the
model has been built so that it requires only a limited amount of inputs, making it
equally applicable to a wide range of materials markets. Finally, the model was built
on a spreadsheet platform for accessibility.
In the following description of the modeling methodology, we will first present the
economic reasoning used to build the model, as well as the diﬀerent characteristics
specific to the mining industry that have been implemented in order to capture
characteristic market imperfections. Then the tool developed will be compared to
other existing models that also describe materials market, and the practical as well as
theoretical diﬀerences that can be observed will be discussed. Finally, this section will
present the implementation of the model, as well as the assumptions used.
3.1 Model Design Philosophy
This section addresses the motivations that lead to the elaboration of the m:5 model,
especially concerning the construction of the supply curves and the market-clearing
mechanism.
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3.1.1 The Notion of Coherence and Correspondence in the
Modeling Approach
This modeling eﬀort seeks to overcome the microeconomic inconsistencies of conven-
tional approaches that will be presented later in this chapter, in Section 3.3, with the
objective of replicating observed market behavior without a major data collection and
reduction eﬀort.
More specifically, this approach was taken in the hope that more closely hewing to
microeconomic theory would not only include the ability to defend the model on the
basis of its stronger theoretical foundation, but also would yield a model requiring
less data — which is characterized by Hammond (1996) as coherence-based research.
Yet, as will be explained in Section 3.3.1, modeling approaches purely based on
economic theory do not fully answer the questions a manufacture may have on a
materials’ market, since they are abstractions of an idealized “rational” market. More
correspondence-based approaches may therefore be required to elaborate complex
modeling tools, adding real-world data and observations. The risk of such approaches
however, as mentioned in Section 3.3.3, is that they may be too data-intensive.
As a result of this trade-oﬀ, the m:5 model has been built from a coherence
perspective, while adding a limited amount of real-world data and observation to
achieve adequate correspondence.
3.1.2 Reflections on Supply Curves
Conventional modeling frameworks for natural resource markets, particularly mining-
based markets, construct a conventional upward-sloping short-run supply curve, by
disaggregating supply by mine and using a “stair-step” approach (Tilton 1992). In
this type of approach, the supply curve relies upon the assumption that an individual
supplier will produce up to a certain quantity at a given — and, hence, constant —
cost. Beyond that quantity, a mine’s supply curve will be vertical and it will stop
producing (i.e., the cost of producing the next unit is essentially infinite, as shown on
Figure 3-1). While this modeling choice is often used, the assumptions that it relies
on, as well as its limitations, are not often explained. We attempt here to provide
some insights into these aspects of this traditional approach.
- First, it is important to stress that assuming that the supply curve is flat up to
a certain point is not straightforward. Appendix A addresses the question of
44
(a) Short-term supply curve for an indi-
vidual actor in a competitive market.
(b) Aggregate supply curves for multiple sup-
pliers, showing the traditional “stair-step” ap-
proach.
Figure 3-1: The aggregation of short-term supply curves resulting in a “stair-step”
curve, as described by Tilton (1992, pages 53 and 55 respectively).
why the first part of the cost curve can be considered as flat when calculating
supply at a timescale that is not instantaneous. Nevertheless, it is important
to acknowledge that this approach is a simplification and does not reproduce
actual cost curves.
- Moreover, limitations arise when assuming that an individual cost curve becomes
vertical after a certain point, since this assumption means that increased prices
do not lead to an increased supply. While supply cannot be infinite and there
are capacity constraints, it is important to account for potential additional
production — whose costs would increase sharply. Indeed, it would become
increasingly expensive to yield each additional unit when producing over the
optimal rated capacity, for instance using overtime labor, etc.
- Finally, representing the total supply curve without adapting it to the level of
demand may be confusing. Simply drawing the curve and inferring the price
where supply meets demand, suggests that we can observe in reality the suppliers
whose costs are above the market clearing price. However, such an assumption
is unrealistic since firms whose operating costs are above the price will — almost
always — not actually operate. In eﬀect, the supply curve components above
the market clearing price essentially present, at best, a prospective supply curve.
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3.1.3 Considerations about Market Clearing
Economic theory assumes that market-clearing will occur, and in particular that
the aggregate supply will meet the aggregate demand at each period. The actual
mechanism that takes place to ensure this market clearing, as well as the way one
can implement it in a market model, are questions that are not often addressed in
common studies1.
A characteristic of markets is that actors cannot fully coordinate at each period;
for practicality reasons first, since it would be extremely hard to gather all producers
or alternatively all consumers to achieve such a coordination. Another reason is due
to the very regulation of markets: suppliers are not allowed to collude and fix a
collaborative price, nor are groups of consumers allowed to form cartels.
Tackling the issue of market clearing in market models, while incorporating both
economic theory and the reality of the market, hence becomes challenging. The m:5
model has been built to address this issue of market clearing by using the notion of
a “market-maker” — as observed for precious metals for instance — that mediates
trades between consumers and suppliers, and computes the “fair” price considering
the balance of current material oﬀers and supplies. While this mechanism usually
takes place on a daily basis with instantaneous supply and demand values, the model
assumes that, on a quarterly basis, the market-maker can infer the aggregate “real”
supply and demand curves, and fix a resulting price. Section 3.2.2 will address this
notion in more details.
3.2 Description of the Model
The m:5 model has been implemented as a spreadsheet model in Microsoft Excel®
for flexibility and transparency. For the purpose of simplifying this stage of model
development, demand is treated as exogenous, although there is no structural limitation
to incorporating a full-blown demand model in the future. In order to add a certain
degree of price responsiveness to simulated demand, these “exogenous” demands can
be made price sensitive by setting a non-zero price elasticity in the model inputs for a
particular consumption sector. With demand trends and a set of inputs describing
sources of supply (i.e., mines, their production economics, and their production
1There is however a formal domain, referred to as the study of the “microstructure” of a market,
that studies these mechanisms. As acknowledged by Cohen et al. (1981), this field has been initiated
by the work of Stigler (1964) and the term itself has been later introduced by Garman (1976).
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capacities), the model can simulate market clearing over time, calculating a market-
clearing supply and price at each period.
Figure 3-2 shows the basic architecture of the model. This schematic representation
of the model identifies the main components of the model. “Candidate suppliers” and
demand are model inputs, and the other components are calculated simulation model
results.
Figure 3-2: Overall architecture of the model. The arrows are an indication that
one component influences the behavior of another. For instance, there is an arrow
linking the “candidate suppliers” and “production” to indicate that the individual cost
curves of suppliers contribute to the calculation of the production. Moreover, two
slashes on an arrow indicate that the impact the unit has on its “target” is delayed
in time — for example, the model assumes that price influences the next period’s
production, as we will mention later.
The next sections will describe in greater detail what each of those model parts
comprise.
3.2.1 Description of Suppliers and Construction of Supply Curves
Most of the inputs required to run the model describe the suppliers. Specifically, a list
of the current mines has to be provided, as well as their respective cost structure. With
these data, the available production can be described as precisely as possible within
the confines of the modeling assumptions, while using data that can be obtainable
from financial reports or that can be derived by observation and intuition.
Using these data, a total industry supply curve is constructed that reflects the
behavior of profit-maximizing firms having the characteristics given in the inputs. The
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functional form for all supply curves derives from an assumption that the marginal
cost is always increasing with Q. In particular, the average cost curve has a polynomial
second derivative of the form (see Appendix B for details of the derivation):
@2AC
@Q2
= a · Qn
Instead of a “conventional" step function, assuming infinite marginal cost above
maximum rated output, we have chosen to approach the question of supply curves
by including the notion of marginal cost curve when the production is greater than
the optimal operating point (i.e. the minimum of the average cost, Q⇤) and, given
the assumption that the second derivative of the average cost is positive, each unit
produced in excess of Q⇤ costs more on the margin. The modeled shape of the
individual supply curves is thus a flat line up to the minimum of the average curve,
and then follows the shape of the marginal cost curve until the ultimate production
capacity of the mine of the period, as explicated in Appendix A.
This behavior is presented in Figure 3-3. In this figure, producer 1 (the red curve) is
able to produce up to a certain quantity at the lowest cost (represented by a horizontal
line) and, beyond that threshold, the cost of production becomes a steep curve —
namely the marginal cost curve — that is interrupted at the maximum production
capacity of the supplier for that period (symbolized by the star on the figure).
In order to account for the fact that market players have incomplete information
and, in particular, the fact that a supplier may not be able to base its quarterly
production on a perfect knowledge of other suppliers, the model is built using the
assumption that the amount of information used for the decision-making is limited to
(a) each supplier’s production curve and (b) the price of the material in the preceding
time period. Since suppliers always try to stay in business and not make a negative
profit, the rationale for this assumption is that each actor produces as much as is
economically feasible until the cost of extraction reaches the price of the last period,
as illustrated in Figure 3-3.
Assuming that suppliers will simply not produce at all if the price is below their
minimum average cost is, however, an overly strong simplifying assumption. Moreover,
it seems unreasonable that a mine would stop producing after having opened if the
price is slightly below its operating level. Instead, the model allows already open
mines to operate at a loss, accumulating that loss up to a cap at which point the mine
simply closes. The rate at which the production declines is estimated at each period,
depending on the diﬀerence between the price and the operating cost. If prices go
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Figure 3-3: An example of aggregated supply curve. Each supplier produces up until
the previous price, or their physical capacity for the period considered.
up again and the mine is still operating, production will also ramp up progressively,
following a comparable pattern. Appendix C fully describes this specific case.
The model also assumes that new mines will open, but a new mine can enter only
when the market price stays above the entering mine’s projected operating cost for at
least 3 full years before it begins producing.
Production is calculated for each operating mine at each period. There are several
possible conditions under which a mine might choose to produce and, to simulate this
behavior, the model implements diﬀerent mechanisms that are — to the best of our
knowledge — reasonable in the sense that they incorporate the notion of incomplete
information as well as some real-world observations about openings and closings of
mines. These implementation choices, fully described in Appendix C, include:
- The “standard” production decision-making of open mines whose operating costs
are below current price and hence maximize their profit by producing up to their
physical capacity or the price level
- The establishing of delays in mine openings, coupled with a monitoring of price
levels to influence the decision of opening the mine on “economic feasibility”
grounds
- The allowing of production at a cost higher than current price when mines are
already open, since an immediate shut-down would be unrealistic. There is
hence a monitoring of financial losses with a fixed cap.
- The establishment of a progressive ramp-up or ramp-down in production when
the price is below the minimum operating cost, with an exponential factor that
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adapts to price levels
The question then arises of how the model determines a market-clearing price,
since production is decided independently by each supplier and is hence not strictly
coordinated, as we mentioned earlier. The next section will describe how we tackled
price-setting as well as demand in our model.
3.2.2 Price-Setting Mechanism and Demand
Price-Setting
While the model simulates the reality of incomplete information by assuming that
suppliers do not base their production decisions on a perfect knowledge of the other
market actors, mines still provide annual financial statements that include information
about production costs. Hence, the model assumes that market clearance occurs
through the actions of a simulated market-maker that gathers financial information of
all producers in order to set the price where the “ideal" supply meets the anticipated
demand. This “ideal” price is the price at which the output of each rational producer
sums to meet current demand, where each rational producer would only produce until
his operating cost equals that of the next supplier. This concept is illustrated on the
Figure 3-4.
When demand intersects the ideal supply curve on a marginal cost curve (as shown
on the Figure 3-4), the market-clearing price is computed as the resulting marginal
cost. However, if the demand curve intersects the supply curve on one of the curve’s
‘flat’ segments, a true market maker would not set the market clearing price equal to
the indicated production cost, because this region of the supply curve is a convenient
fiction, as explained in Appendix A. Instead, when demand intersects the supply
curve on a step, the model computes the price according to whether or not the ideal
supply of the “cut-oﬀ” supplier exceeded demand. The modeled market-maker selects
a cost-based price that encourages a lower discrepancy between supply and demand in
the following year, as detailed in Appendix C. Finally, the calculated price is averaged
with its previous value in order to limit significant — and possibly unrealistic — price
excursions.
Demand
As indicated in preceding sections, the model treats demand as exogenously defined,
with consumption distributed across several market segments, each having its own
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Figure 3-4: The price is set by the market-maker where the demand meets the “ideal"
supply curve.
annual growth rate.
In order to consider the eﬀects of diﬀerential responses to price excursions across
these segments, each consumption sector can be assigned a characteristic price elasticity,
which imparts a limited price responsiveness to the overall sectorial growth in each
period. Appendix D will describe in greater detail how we accounted for elasticity.
The functional form of the supply curves — in particular the stability convention
leading to their “flat part” — combined with both incompleteness of information and
limited demand sensitivity, inevitably results in a discrepancy between supply and
demand, which the model treats by the creation of a stock. The next section describes
how stock is handled, as well as how mines evolve dynamically.
3.2.3 Stock and Mine Dynamics
Because of incomplete information and constraints on coordination, suppliers tend
to produce a quantity that may not be strategically optimal to match demand. In
particular, a profit-maximizing firm will operate at the output level where its marginal
cost of production equals the market price, instead of stopping where their cost reaches
the level of the next supplier. When the production exceeds its “ideal” level (indicated
on Figure 3-4) we assign the resulting production imbalance to a running stock in the
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model. The model seeks to avoid stock accumulation during the following period by
assigning the oversupply from the preceding period to a virtual “supplier” that has
a lower operating cost than all primary producers. This computation choice might
be changed in the future, but satisfies both our simplicity requirement and empirical
evidence.
In addition to running individual stocks for each producer, the cumulative produc-
tion is monitored to account for mine expansion and ore grade degradation. A first
order estimation approach to ore grade degradation was developed. This degradation
results in the ‘expansion’ of the mine, and in particular in the evolution of the optimal
production quantity as well as the concomitant increase in operating costs, as explained
in Appendix E.
Now that we have laid the theoretical grounds of the model, it is interesting to
evaluate how the m:5 model diﬀers from existing modeling approaches to materials’
availability.
3.3 Presentation of Existing Modeling Approaches
and Comparison with the m:5 Model
Materials availability has long been the subject of study in the field of environmental
economics, and many models have been built to explore the question of scarcity and
market volatility. This section reviews the diﬀerent approaches that exist, namely
economic abstraction, econometrics and financial modeling as well as simulation tools.
3.3.1 Analytical Modeling Using Economic Abstraction
The work of Hotelling (1931) has been the origin of many research works on the
economics of materials exhaustion. From this theory and its developments have
resulted diﬀerent modeling approaches, grounded in an economic abstraction of the
behavior of non-renewable resources markets.
Presentation of the General Economic Approach
The following rule has been derived from the work of Harold Hotelling: the market
price that leads to the socially eﬃcient rate of extraction of an exhaustible resource is
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the price that ensures that a producer’s rent (i.e. the diﬀerence between the market
price and the marginal extraction cost) increases at the social discount rate. This
social discount rate is often assumed to be a market interest rate. The rule derives
from the observation that, for an exhaustible resource, there is an opportunity cost to
a firm extracting a material at any point in time, since the potential profits of selling
it at a later time are foregone. The private actor, in the case of perfect competition,
will hence be indiﬀerent when the “scarcity” rent of extraction, which is total marginal
cost (or market price) minus the marginal cost of extraction, is increasing at a rate
equal to the current interest rate for a potential investment of the money obtained
when selling the material.
Subsequent work has added to Hotelling’s original approach to the economics of
exhaustible resources by considering exploration and reserve uncertainty (Pindyck
1978), technological development (Solow 1956), as well as increasing marginal extrac-
tion cost and materials substitutability (Dasgupta and Heal 1974). In their article,
Devarajan and Fisher (1981) review the major developments in the field, emanating
from Hoteling’s work.
An interesting result that comes from such an approach is that when the marginal
cost of extraction increases, the marginal user cost or scarcity rent of the material
decreases until the total marginal cost of extracting the material reaches that of a
substitute. At that point, it is not dynamically eﬃcient to produce the first material,
and its exploitation is abandoned for the benefit of the substitute (ideally a renewable
resource) — there is hence no real exhaustion but rather an abandonment of the
resource (Dasgupta and Heal 1974). This concept is illustrated on Figure 3-5 where
both the evolution of marginal costs and extraction are represented.
Limitations of the Approach
Such approaches however present several limitations.
Perhaps one of the most important ones — considering the scope of this work —
is the fact that it takes an abstract economic point-of-view, looking at the question of
material availability with the lens of the market as a whole and economic eﬃciency
from a macroeconomic perspective. As a result, a manufacturer will not be able to
use such an approach to make a short-term decision about a material, since the notion
of individual firm and individual impact of exhaustion is not really studied. Rather,
the approach of Hotelling and his intellectual inheritors is a long-term consideration
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Figure 3-5: The case of a non-renewable resource with an increasing marginal cost of
extraction, based on the theory developed by Dasgupta and Heal (1974).
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based on “socially optimal extraction”, the “known” reserves for the material, and the
aggregate marginal extraction cost.
Other limitations come from the adopted idealized vision of the market. While
authors such as Hotelling do consider the case of monopolies, other market imperfec-
tions — incompleteness of information, exogenous disruptive events like conflicts or
strikes, externalities, poorly defined property rights etc. — are not usually explicitly
considered, which results in an assessment that does not encompass the whole picture
of the market. While it is interesting to develop this type of approach in order to
frame theories about non-renewable resources, it is less relevant for a manufacturer
that needs a criticality-assessment in the short-term that considers as many criticality
sources as possible, in particular market imperfections.
Comparison of Such Approaches with the m:5 Model
Them:5model as described in Section 3.1 diﬀers from economic abstraction approaches
by providing a tool that focuses decisions and strategies at the firm-level, both on
the supply-side and on the demand-side of the materials markets. Moreover, the
timescale considered is significantly diﬀerent, since the abstract economics approaches
described above tend to focus on the long run, whereas the model developed during
this work emphasizes the short-term — while still incorporating medium- to long-term
considerations such as depletion and mine expansions.
The m:5 model is also shaped to be used by an individual decision-maker that can
refine the outputs of the model by implementing diﬀerent demand scenarios; conversely,
approaches grounded on an economic abstraction of markets consider the market as a
whole and not the specific events leading to the abandonment of a resource, but rather
its inevitableness because of aggregate cost and finite crustal abundance. This focus
derives from the desire to develop a tool that informs individual firm decision-making,
which is both short-term and typically contingent upon an uncertain future.
The construction of the short-term supply curves in the m:5 model has been
grounded in standard economic theory, since much of the behavior of individual
mines can be treated through conventional microeconomic arguments about profit
maximizing behavior, particularly the way in which pricing signals influence production
decisions.
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3.3.2 Financial-Based Modeling Approaches
The financial modeling-based approach is one that is often used by consulting firms
and some manufacturers. Instead of reliance upon economic theory to frame the
model, it employs econometric regressions of financial data to infer future demand
and supply.
Presentation of the Financial Models
Mines prepare annual financial reports to present their operating results — including
their annual production and their operating cost — which is the main source of data
for financial models. Assuming that firm production decisions are based upon cash
flow recovery, these econometric models aggregate the known capacities of existing and
prospective mines, ordering them from lowest to highest operation cost to generate an
industry supply curve. Then, using demand forecasts, these models set the price level
using the estimated industry supply curve to find where the level of industry output
fulfills forecast demand.
The timeframe considered in these approaches is very short, usually spanning from
one to four years. Supply and demand data are gathered on a yearly or bi-annual basis.
Usually, a regression of either supply or demand is then run on diﬀerent parameters
— and in particular market price. The equilibrium point of price and output is then
inferred from the other curve, so that forecasted supply can meet this consumption
target. It is hence a short-term approach.
These financial models are particularly useful in revealing price cycles and trends,
as well as the eﬀect of exploration or technological changes on markets, by studying
historical data and inferring relevant drivers and parameters (Labys, Lesourd, and
Badillo 1998).
Limitations of the Approach
Financial-based models present several limitations that are diﬀerent from those cited
previously for models based on economic abstraction.
On the one hand, they are largely grounded in financial reporting data, evaluating
demand on the one hand and supply on the other. This approach gets around the
so-called “identification problem” (Koopmans 1949) when using regression to model
supply and demand, since there is nothing in the historical data that can distinguish
between the two — there is, in eﬀect, only one observation than can be made which is
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simultaneously demand and supply. The regression approach, therefore, usually relies
on the very important assumption that supply and demand can be independently
determined and ignores potential interactions and dynamics2. In particular, demand
is calculated based on historical trends of given parameters, independently from the
question of price levels or supply constraints.
On the other hand, a regression model fundamentally assumes that the future will
be similar to the past. Hence, structural changes in the market deriving for instance
from technological discovery, restructuring of consumer demand, or fundamental
income eﬀects, are not formally accounted for in the model, unless specifically treated
in the formulation — which requires technical insights that most financially-focused
analysts are unlikely to have. The short-term aspect of such assessments thus provides
good insight when a decision needs to be made very quickly, but this limits the
visibility for a manufacturer that would like to study diﬀerent scenarios and have a
better sense of medium-term market behaviors. An example would be that of a firm
that is planning on launching a new technology and would need the 10 to 15 years
projection of the market in order to verify whether the supply for the required material
is suﬃciently well established to sustain a mass development of the technology, or not.
The insights a financial model would provide in such a case would not incorporate
either the “disruptive” aspect of the demand pattern or the longer-term eﬀect of this
increase in demand.
Finally, the scope of the projections can sometimes be more tuned towards supply
actors, and in particular the decision for price is based on the financial data of the
diﬀerent mines. Moreover, the way in which regression on demand is performed
depends on the modeler’s choice. In particular, demand aggregation for the diﬀerent
demand sectors can be done either prior to any regression, hence what is considered is
the total ‘consumption’ for the material; or regression can be performed for each sector
independently and then the curves aggregated. While the second case may provide
manufacturers with useful insight so as to how specific structural characteristics of
demand may influence the market, it can be much harder to identify which sector has
a structural impact in the first case. Hence, from a manufacturer perspective, it can
be challenging to extract sector-level information to inform better decisions, while the
fact that diﬀerent sectors can behave diﬀerently can actually have a very significant
impact on the market, as will be discussed later in Section 4.2.2.
2There are very sophisticated techniques that are used to solve this issue — such as regression
models of simultaneous equations (see, for instance, Kmenta and Gilbert 1968) — but their complexity
tends to limit their applicability in the real world.
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Comparison of Such Approaches with the m:5 Model
In essence, a financial model will be similar to the modeling approach that has been
adopted in this work, since they both can be characterized as supply-demand models.
In particular, the price is set at a level high enough to enable the last producer to
operate at a “reasonable” cost — namely at a cost that allows him to recover his total
cost.
Several aspects of financial models diﬀer from this work’s approach, however. The
first one is that the timeframes within which the models work are diﬀerent, since the
m:5 model aims at projecting supply and price suﬃciently far out in time — about
15 years — so that manufacturers can get a better picture of the market evolution
and make better-informed design and production decisions.
Another conceptual diﬀerence between the two approaches is that financial models
do not account for the interactions between supply and demand, nor do they adjust
demand to price levels and supply evolutions. Conversely, the supply-demand m:5
model has been built so that demand would be sensitive to price evolutions, and hence
indirectly to supply. The supply-demand interaction is also implemented in the m:5
model via the establishment of a stock, arising when there is a discrepancy between
supply and demand levels, and aﬀecting the price by changing the shape of the supply
curve.
Hence the m:5 model is similar in essence to financial models, but adopts the point
of view of an individual firm or demand sector in order to devise demand decisions
that are sustainable on the current market.
3.3.3 Simulation Tools: the Example of System Dynamics
Modeling
Finally, diﬀerent types of simulation tools have been developed to look at materials
availability with a dynamics perspective. These methods, and in particular system
dynamics models, are very comprehensive in that they aim at representing a complex
system by using a system of interdependent non-linear first order diﬀerential equations.
These systems are reduced to diﬀerence equations, which are then used as the basis for
simulation models that develop system behavior for a variety of initial and operating
conditions.
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Presentation of System Dynamics Models
System dynamics models are particularly eﬃcient when it comes to modeling the
behavior of inhomogeneous actors, as well as implementing time delays. The notion of
feedback is also of great importance, and such models work with influence relationships
between systems — for instance for recycling as a secondary supply stream. In
particular, Alonso from the Materials Systems Laboratory at MIT developed a system
dynamics model for the platinum market (Alonso 2010) showing that changes in
recycling rates, resulting either from market forces or extra-market policies, can
significantly influence market prices in materials markets subject to supply pressures.
The work by Urbance of the Materials Systems Laboratory (Urbance 2001; Urbance et
al. 2002) used a systems dynamics model to study the responsiveness of the magnesium
supply chain to changes in automotive demand. The study revealed the dominant
influence of barriers to entry — deriving from the technical and economic structure of
the magnesium die casting industry — upon the expansion potential for the structural
magnesium market overall.
The price-setting mechanism in the model by Alonso (2010), as well as other system
dynamics models, is driven by inventory coverage. More specifically, it is assumed
that a market-maker ensures liquidity on the market by selling and buying from an
inventory in order to set the price at the level where the producers willingness-to-accept
is equal to the consumers willingness-to-pay. More specifically, the pricing mechanism
formally examines the size of this inventory coverage, and adjusts prices according to
the simulated level of coverage as compared to a targeted level of coverage.
Limitations of the Approach
System dynamics models are often very thorough in their description of the market —
a large amount of data is collected in order to describe as accurately as possible the
behavior of each individual actor in the market. As a result, the resources required to
gather enough data for such a model are extremely large. In many cases, it could take
several person-years of eﬀort to gather enough information about supply, demand,
recycling and speculation in order to accurately describe the market for one given
material. Such an approach is incredibly time- and resource-intensive and cannot
always be used by manufacturers that need a quick assessment of market behavior
for several materials. While it provides great insights on the market as a whole and
enables the user to keep track of the diﬀerent flows over time, the amount of eﬀort
required to build it and have it running is very large.
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Moreover, system dynamics models frequently rely on modeling ‘fictions’ that
are elaborated by the model creator, such as the notion of “inventory coverage”, or
measures of “willingness of an actor to make a specific decision”. Such fictions are not
grounded in reality and, while proxies can be developed, have no real either physical
or analytical analog. Hence, a third-party user might treat the model as a “black-box”
tool, which lessens its eﬀectiveness. A model that instead relies on available and
reported data as well as uses generally-accepted theoretical constructs in a transparent
manner, oﬀers a better understanding of its operations and, thus, of its results.
Comparison of Such Approaches with the Model Presented
When building the m:5 model, the intent was to implement a suﬃcient amount of
information about the market so as to accurately capture structural characteristics,
while keeping it suﬃciently simple and flexible in order for a manufacturer to easily
switch from one material to another, and run insightful analyses without spending
too many resources to do so.
The m:5 model hence diﬀers from system dynamics approaches by using a less
data-intensive approach to materials markets; the downside of such an approach is
that it inherently reduces the accuracy of the modeling by limiting the amount of
precision put into the model. Instead of requiring a full description of all the actors on
the market, the m:5 model only requires a list of suppliers with some financial data
in order to describe the supply curve, but the latter has the same functional form
for each actor, even though it is parametrizable. However, this loss of accuracy is an
implementation-specific design feature. If the analyst wants to increase the resolution
power of the m:5 model, it is possible to do so by simply expanding its implementation
through increased data. On the other hand, this design flexibility cannot be found
in system dynamics model, since the calculations are not transparent. For instance,
there is no data that can reveal “inventory coverage” or other pseudo-metrics used by
modelers to describe actions.
Another diﬀerence in the system dynamics approach is the way inventory is
considered. In the case of system dynamics models, inventory is what ultimately
sets the price, using the rationale that, if the inventory is too low, the price should
increase to provide a suﬃcient incentive for producers to enter the market and produce
more, and vice versa. In the supply-demand model developed for this work however,
inventory is merely an instrument for managing period-to-period imbalances in supply
and demand, and is not the dominant factor in setting the market clearing price.
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While system dynamics models are very thorough and powerful tools that com-
prehensively capture the complexity of materials markets and model the dynamic
interactions between supply, demand and price, they require a very detailed description
of all the individual components of the market that are endogenous to the model.
As a result, the data and resources required are too high to be gathered in a timely
fashion for many diﬀerent materials, putting real limits on the ability of an individual
firm to make strategic decisions across a broad spectrum of materials.
This section reviewed the existing modeling methods that tackle the question of
materials availability. The supply-demand model that has been developed is aimed
at tackling the gaps we have identified in this section, and at providing a simple and
generalizable tool, easily parametrizable by a manufacturer and requiring few inputs,
yet still capturing the notion of market dynamics and imperfections. The following
section will detail the diﬀerent trade-oﬀs that have been made when constructing the
m:5 model, in order to reach the desired level of precision while limiting the eﬀort
required to reach it.
3.4 Specifics of the m:5 Model and Applicability
This section presents the specifics about how a user can use them:5model to customize
it for the materials market of interest, as well as to assess alternative demand scenarios
and policy strategies. While Section 3.1 describes the theory behind the m:5 model,
here we demonstrate how it can be used in practice, as well as present the type of
question it can or cannot answer given its limitations and assumptions.
3.4.1 A User “Manual” for the m:5 Model
This section presents the diﬀerent actions a user can perform with the model, in order
to implement diﬀerent scenarios and compare their relative impact on the market. In
particular, it describes what can be specified in the user inputs and how structural
changes in the market — whether in the demand or the supply side — can be translated
into parameter changes in the model.
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Interface with the Supply Side
In the m:5 model, the list of suppliers — described using a limited set of financial
data at the desired starting point of the simulation — is defined as an input. It is this
list that makes the model specific to a given material market, since it describes the
current (and possibly expected) market players.
While the general shape of the supply curve is set by modeling assumptions based
on economic theory and a desire to limit the amount of information needed to run the
model, the actual parameters of the supply curve may be specified by the user.
The inputs required to describe a supplier are listed below, and fully described in
Appendices A, B and E:
- Q⇤i , the initial optimal production quantity. It is the quantity that the mine
should be producing at a given period, in order to operate at its lowest average
cost.
- A⇤i , the initial minimum average cost of production. It is the point where
the average cost curve and the marginal cost curve cross, and the resulting
production is Q⇤i .
- a, the multiplicative factor of the second derivative of the average cost function.
It is a scaling factor.
- n, the polynomial exponent of the second derivative of the average cost curve.
It is possible to change it to aﬀect the steepness of the marginal cost curve —
hence allowing for more or less supply above the “optimal” production point,
as explained in Section 3.2. Adjustments to this parameter could be used, for
instance, to compare the eﬀect of a more or a less stringent environmental
mining regulation: the steeper the curve, the more stringent the policy (i.e., a
steeper curve indicates that it gets increasingly more expensive to produce each
additional unit).
- f1 and f2, the two interpolation parameters to invert the marginal cost curve.
While they are mainly calculation parameters, f2 also is the multiplicative factor
of Q⇤ that is the upper limit of production at each period. For instance, if
f2 = 2, then the mine cannot produce more than 2 ·Q⇤ at each period — due to
physical and operational constraints.
- ↵, the rate of decline of the ore grade. The higher it is, the more quickly the ore
grade will degrade when the cumulative production increases.
- gi and gmin, the initial and minimum ore grades, respectively. In particular, gmin
constitutes the ore grade floor, in the sense that a lower ore grade would not be
economically profitable to exploit for the mine.
- Ktot, the expected total cumulative output of the mine. It is the ‘reserve’ of
62
resource that investors project when opening the mine.
- ⌧life, the projected lifetime of the mine, as established by the investors when
opening the mine — it is used to allocate the investment costs over time.
-  , the capital invested initially in the mine, discounted for its expected lifetime.
Because m:5 is a spreadsheet model, the user can easily access the individual
calculations made to simulate supply and other outputs for each time period. As a
result, the user can implement a “supply disruption” scenario, where, without impairing
the overall behavior of the model, the user can choose to let a given mine either stop
producing for a given number of periods, or produce only a fixed amount for a given
period of time (simulating a quota).
Finally, the m:5 model can be used to simulate the opening of new mines. If
potential new actors are described on the inputs page, the model will add them to the
list of suppliers if the price is high enough that they can feasibly operate. The model,
of course, considers that there will be a delay in the opening of a new mine, reflecting
the influence of risk aversion on the part of the new mine operator. If these conditions
are satisfied, the model will incorporate this new mine into the market supply, and
oﬀers a assessment of the eﬀect this additional supply source may have on the market.
Changes in Demand
One of the design choices made when building this modeling tool was to have demand
exogenously defined. While a notion of feedback has been implemented via the use
of price elasticity of demand, the underlying demand trend is defined by exogenous
parameters — such as the growth rate and the price elasticity of each sector. Hence
the user of the model has the ability to refine a demand scenario and evaluate the
consequences of the diﬀerent parameters on the simulation results.
A user can choose to have the demand calculated at each period following the
functional form described in Appendix D. As constructed in the model, total demand
has been segmented into diﬀerent sectors that can be independently described. By
providing a growth rate, a seasonal factor, a price elasticity, and the demand segment’s
relative share of the global demand at the initial point in time, a manufacturer can
describe an existing market and use growth forecasts for each sector in order to see
the impact of such a scenario on the existing market. Additionally, recycling has
been implemented in the m:5 model as an exogenous mechanism whose occurrence is
specific to each demand sector, characterized by the recovery rate and the average
lifetime of products within each sector.
63
Demand can also be described fully exogenously by using a direct forecast and
using this externally estimated scenario as a time series executed by the model. This
operating mode is particularly useful when a decision-maker has already developed
a specific demand scenario and wants to see its impact on the market. This feature
exists so as to allow for more sophisticated demand scenarios, since the current
implementation of demand is fairly simplistic.
Other Actionable Levers
Besides direct interactions with the list of suppliers and the diﬀerent demand sectors’
parameters, the m:5 model oﬀers other parametrizable calculation tools. These
features have been implemented for transparency and flexibility — the model makes
some general assumptions about markets, but oﬀers the possibility to change these
assumptions.
Opening and Closing of Mines: As described in Appendix C, the model allows
for mines to operate at a loss, since it would not be realistic to completely shut
down the mine on the sole ground that the price just went below the minimum
operating cost of the mine. The moving financial loss is monitored over a period
of time that can be set by the user, and the overall loss acceptable before the
complete shut-down of the facility is also a modeling parameter. Moreover,
production ramps up and down according to an exponential factor ⌧ (defined
in Appendix C), whose evolution, given the cumulative loss, can also be tuned
by the user. As a component of the model’s simulation of the “opening” of a
new mine, the length of the period during which the price should be above the
projected operating cost of a new mine can also be set by the user.
Price Elasticity of Demand: Appendix D describes how price elasticity of demand
is used to implement the notion of supply-demand feedback. Because this calcu-
lation depends upon a weighted average of past prices, the user can incorporate
additional refinement to each demand sector’s price sensitivity, by changing both
the weights of the moving average and its length.
Price-Setting and Production: The assumptions governing the behavior of the
market-maker can be modified by the user — in particular, the values used to
adjust the price level if there is an under- or an over-supply can be changed.
Moreover, while the production calculation currently allows producers to extract
up to the minimum of (a) the price of the previous period or (b) their ultimate
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physical capacity at that period, that decision-making can be changed by using,
for instance, an expected price value. While these calculations are not fully
parametrized yet, they are easily accessible.
3.4.2 Assumptions and Resulting Simplifications of the m:5
Model
This section presents the diﬀerent simplifications that have been adopted during the
implementation of the model.
Exploration and Discovery
The current version of the m:5 model is deterministic. In particular, the list of
suppliers — current and projected — is set by the user. A mechanism has been
devised so that the entrance of a new actor on the market is delayed in time and
grounded in the rationale that the operating and investment costs are recovered over
a reasonable timeframe. While the decision of opening the mine is based on the price
level, it is deterministic in that only the listed suppliers may be in the market.
In reality, the market for non-renewable resources presents uncertainty, especially
when it comes to discovery. In his paper, Pindyck (1978) introduces the notion that
the reserve base is variable. The m:5 model incorporates an idea of exploration, in
that each mine evolves with respect to its cumulative production; specifically (a) the
ore grade degrades at a certain rate (set by the user), (b) the production increases
with time while (c) the cost of extraction slightly increases as well, but this process is
deterministic.
The scope of the model is to address the short- to medium-term question of
whether a demand scenario is sustainable given the current supply sources. Because a
stochastic discovery and exploration process introduces considerable complexity, these
features were not implemented in this version of the model. However, future work on
the model could incorporate the question of variability in discovery of new mines and
expansion of existing ones.
The Question of Stock and Investment
One of the main assumptions of the m:5 model lies in the way material stocks have
been implemented. In m:5, stocks are a bookkeeping instrument to account for
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oversupply or undersupply in any time period. When stocks are nonzero, the value
of the stock is currently treated as an additional supplier having the lowest cost of
all operating suppliers so that the stock accumulated at one period will be consumed
in the next period. As a result, stock as it is handled for now aﬀects the price by
shifting the supply curve “to the right”, increasing the available supply on the market
and possibly lowering the price of the resource — conversely, an undersupply leads to
an increase in price.
In reality, a more strategic handling of stocks takes place in the market. On the
one hand, manufacturers may have an incentive to keep a certain level of inventory as
a buﬀer to hedge against demand when prices for feedstocks are excessive. Similarly,
producers themselves might keep a positive level of inventory that they can use to
manage variable or seasonal demand — it hence becomes a safety buﬀer. In the
current version of the model, this “running stock” is held constant for each actor, and
it is not elastic to price levels.
Another aspect of stock is its influence on the behavior of a third class of actors in
the resource market, that of investors or speculators. In markets like precious metals,
the high stakes and material values lead to the involvement of outside actors — such
as investors — that are neither direct consumers nor suppliers. By buying stock at low
prices and selling it when prices increase, these speculative investors add an additional
complexity to the market and influence price levels by acting either as consumers or
producers, depending on price levels.
Such behaviors will have an impact on price levels, and can either result in exacer-
bated price excursions, or conversely in a reduced price volatility. For simplification
reasons, and in order to limit the amount of necessary input data, the current model
can only implement these behaviors in a limited fashion. Indeed, a demand sector can
be created with an upward-sloping demand curve (i.e. a positive price elasticity). Yet
this approach does not capture the full scope of an investor’s behavior and further
modeling eﬀorts could be oriented towards implementing it in greater detail.
The Handling of Recycling
A related modeling simplification is that m:5 implements recycling as both exogenous
and deterministic. a recovery rate and an average product lifetime are modeling input
parameters for each sector. The quantity recycled at each period is then determined
as a fixed percentage of the demand at time ti = t  product lifetime. This approach
assumes that both the recovery rate and the product lifetime are certain, hence making
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the recycling stream deterministic. The quantity recycled at each period is then added
to the stock value and gets consumed at the next period.
A more realistic perspective on recycling could incorporate uncertainty both
concerning the rate and the lifetime of the products. Since recycling is determined
by demand sector, the model could be improved by using probabilistic distributions
around the average values for recycling, rendering this simulation of the secondary
stream stochastic, in closer accord with reality.
As was the case for stock, the amount of material that gets recycled at each period
may be held so as to get sold when the prices are higher. Similarly, higher prices
on the market may encourage a higher recycling rate. Hence, incorporating price
sensitivity when calculating the quantity of material recycled and sold may add some
additional realism in the model and make the estimate of price at each period more
accurate.
Yet, even with these limitations, recycling still has an impact on the overall stability
of the market, as we will see in Section 4.1.3.
3.4.3 What Types of Questions Can the m:5 Model Answer?
Based on the description of the model that has been given in Section 3.2 and on the
model assumptions and limitations listed in the previous paragraphs, this section
provides insights so as to what type of questions can be treated by the m:5 model
and the insights that can be gained from the use of such a model.
First, it is important to note that the model that has been developed does not
have a predictive purpose, but rather is a tool that enables the user to compare
diﬀerent scenarios, evaluate their relative impact, and act on diﬀerent market-level
levers. Rather than giving exact values for future prices and supply, the model aims
at warning the decision-maker when there is a risk with a large potential impact, from
the point of view of the manufacturer. It can hence be seen as a tool that (a) flags
excessive risks and (b) compares the relative impacts diﬀerent scenarios and policies
can have on the market and on a manufacturer in particular.
In the rest of this section, we will provide some sample questions the model can
answer, considering its foundations and limitations, and given the actionable levers
that have been mentioned in Section 3.4.1.
67
Questions Relative to Supply
The m:5 model oﬀers a great flexibility in the characterization of the suppliers. As a
result, several types of questions can be addressed via the use of the model. Some
examples are provided below.
Influence of Supply Structure: By changing the distribution of suppliers — the
concentration of supply, as well as the distribution of cost levels — the user
can compare the relative impact of diﬀerent structural characteristics that can
reflect real-world observations of evolutions of supply sources. Moreover, the
eﬀects of mine openings or closings can be explored.
Impact of Supply Instability By imposing supply values for particular suppliers
over a given period of time (for instance, forcing a supplier to not produce for
number of years), the decision-maker can study the eﬀect of such a disruption
on the price and the behavior of the market in the longer-term. When looking
at critical elements, supply disruptions may occur due to external events —
conflicts, strikes, governmental strategies, etc. If there is an expected risk of
such supply disruption, it is possible for a manufacturer to see its relative impact
on the market and hence help him devise a better-informed strategies in the
face of these risks.
Eﬀect of Mine Dynamics By allowing mines to expand with respect to their cu-
mulative production and the resulting depletion of the ore grade, the user can
analyze the relative impact of mine maturation and aging has on the longer-term
supply for the material, since it depends on the actual production.
Questions Relative to Demand
By treating the demand as exogenous, the m:5 model allows for a large flexibility
in the implementation of demand scenarios. Several types of questions can hence be
asked by a manufacture or a policy-maker; some are listed below:
Influence of Demand Structure Launching a new technology that uses a signif-
icant amount of a given material means either creating a new demand sector,
or increasing the demand of an existing sector. In both cases, projecting the
resulting expected demand in the m:5 model will enable a decision-maker to
evaluate whether the current state of supply can sustain the increase in demand
or to project the point in time when demand becomes unsustainable.
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Impact of Demand Instability As was the case for supply, critical materials mar-
kets can be subject to instability on the demand side. Because of the often
constrained supply, some demand sectors may decide to abandon the material
for a substitute. The model oﬀers the possibility to simulate the impact of such
a disruption on the market.
Eﬀect of Price Elasticity Another type of question that the model can address is
that of the impact price sensitivity of a demand sector on the market. While
an individual manufacturer may have a very clear sense of his particular price
sensitivity of demand, what really drives price fluctuations in the face of supply
disruptions is the collective sensitivity of the overall market. By decomposing
price elasticity according to end-use sector, m:5 enables the analyst to explore
the implications of price sensitivity diﬀerences by sector, with particular emphasis
on how marketshare interacts with this parameter.
Questions Relative to Other Types of Policies
Finally, several levers have been implemented to compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent policies
on the market, including public policies.
The Role of Recycling: While precious metals’ markets have a well-established
secondary stream with an eﬃcient recycling process, it is not the case for all
materials. It can hence be interesting to evaluate the impact of the introduction
of, or changes to a secondary stream upon the market, especially when facing a
high demand or an unstable primary supply.
The Eﬀect of Policies Specific to a Material: There are a variety of situations
in which the market for a specific material may be constrained by public policies
that are external to the primary market. One example could be that of the
conflict minerals, where the US government discourages the importation of
materials from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Another is the case of
precious metals: automobile emissions standards have lead to the development
and widespread deployment of catalytic converters, and significantly increased
the demand for PGMs. The model can address these and similar questions by
limiting the number of available suppliers in the first case, or increasing the base
demand of the automotive sector in the second case, for instance.
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The Impact of Environmental Mining Regulations: While critical materials’
markets are not always well-regulated, it can be expected that more stringent
mining standards will be imposed in the future. In particular, in the case of
REEs, the mining processes in China have put a high stress on the environment,
and have recently been more stringently regulated (Situation and Policies of
China’s Rare Earth Industry 2010). By changing the cost curve parameters, and
in particular those of the marginal cost of extraction, the model user can address
the question of relative impact of the policy on the stability of the market,
since it directly implements the policy by changing the cost of extracting each
additional unit.
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter presents insights that can be obtained through the use of the model, as
well as a discussion of what can be gained from the use of such a model and what
the trade-oﬀs are between how much eﬀort has to be applying this type of tool and
the improvement it makes. Finally, the model and general observations of critical
materials markets are used to provide potential policy strategies to mitigate some
types of material criticality.
4.1 Use of the Model to Illustrate Critical Materials’
Markets Behaviors
This section presents results that have been obtained with the model to illustrate the
behavior of critical materials’ markets, and show how the m:5 model can capture
some characteristic dynamics of markets. In particular, the following paragraphs will
address the use of m:5 to explore the structural characteristics of supply and demand,
as well as the impact of diﬀerent policies that have been mentioned in Section 3.4.3.
The inputs used for these analyses are fictional, yet loosely based on real precious
metals markets and, in particular, the market for platinum.
4.1.1 Influence of Structural Characteristics of Supply
This section addresses issues of supply structure. Critical minerals markets are
frequently supply constrained, as presented in the second chapter of this thesis. It
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is hence interesting to model common supply constraints observed on markets and
evaluate the overall behavior of the market with the m:5 model.
The Case of Supply Disruption
In many cases, the supply chains for critical materials have proven to be relatively
fragile to operating dislocations. In particular, external events such as conflicts or
strikes have impaired the mining operations in a producing country for a certain
period of time, often having a dramatic impact on the supply chain and ultimately
on manufacturers dependent upon that material. Cobalt is a good example of this
dynamic: close to half of the world’s cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC)1. In the 1970’s, political unrest in the DRC and Zaire resulted
in the temporary interruption of cobalt exports. This restricted supply, combined
with increasing cobalt demand and decreasing producer inventories, caused cobalt
prices to skyrocket. Though the supply disruption was temporary, the cobalt market
suﬀered: price excursions further nourished labor unrest in Zaire and Zambia, the
costs increased and led to source relocations, and manufacturers had to substitute
cobalt for alternative materials as well as develop new technologies (Alonso 2010).
The m:5 model can enable the user to evaluate market’s resilience to disruptive
events. To illustrate this, the following set of general model parameters has been used.
- The market is moderately concentrated (HHI = 20%)
- The demand is moderately elastic and grows at a 4% rate
- There is no recycling stream
- The supply disruptions have been implemented as taking place during one
year, for both a large supplier (30% of the total supply) and a smaller actor
(representing about 12% of the total supply)
The model outputs, namely supply and price, are presented below:
First, the three supply and demand curves on Figure 4-1 illustrate the direct
impact of supply disruption: in both Figures 4-1b and 4-1c, a “dip” in the supply is
easily observable. In the case of the figure 4-1c in particular, the decrease in supply is
more noticeable — since the actor dropping out is larger — and there is a significant
impact on the demand (the dotted line) since it is price elastic.
The price evolution shown in Figure 4-2 is particularly interesting. First, it is
clear that, in both disruption cases, prices increase due to the sudden undersupply.
1It is important to note that cobalt is not part of the “conflict materials” as defined by the
Dodd-Frank Act, because its mining takes place in a part of the country that is not subject to the
same conflicts and hence has not been restrained by the US government.
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(a) Supply and demand curves in a case
without disruption.
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(c) Supply and demand curves when a
large producer drops out for a year.
Figure 4-1: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 4% demand
growth rate and a moderate elasticity.
The magnitude of the peak, however, is highly dependent on the magnitude of the
disruption: a larger actor dropping out leads in this case to a peak about four times
as high than when a smaller actor drops out.
The model simulations also tend to exhibit a fairly rapid return to ‘equilibrium’
for both prices and supply, hence suggesting that this market is resilient.
Coming back to critical materials markets, such a result can be extremely interesting
for a manufacturer since the vulnerability of the supply chain to disruptions is clear,
but can be highly dependent on the supply structure of the market itself. In the
cobalt case, Zaire dropping out for a short period of time had a great impact because
the relative size of that actor was very large — Zaire and Zambia represented about
two-thirds of the global supply at the time (see Alonso 2010, Chapter 3, pp. 45–46).
The impact on price was hence very important. The resilience of markets will depend
in part on the ability of the demand sectors to cope with the disruptions, which may
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Figure 4-2: Price evolutions resulting from the diﬀerent supply disruption scenarios,
and comparison with the base case of no disruption.
lead to decreased demand — via substation or technological change — or on potential
new entrants on the supply-side that would alleviate the reliance on the unreliable
supply source. In the case of cobalt, the crisis resulted in a manifestation of both
strategies.
Impact of Entry of New Actors
The mining industry is a particularly cost-intensive industry; as a result, any new
entrant will require time to develop confidence that the market price will be high
enough to ensure cost recovery, before entering the market. While these delays on the
part of the new entrant are understandable, it is less clear how these delays might
impact market behavior.
The following analysis explores this question by introducing diﬀerent degrees of
delay on the part of new entrants and couples the analysis with the question of supply
cost distribution. In particular, one would expect that the response of the market
to entry delay would be related both to the time to become “convinced” and the
magnitude of the cost increase the new entrant required. Indeed, there is an interesting
question of what type of new entrants are we considering: are they operating at a fairly
low cost, comparable to that of already operating mines, or are they on the contrary
perhaps smaller and more costly? To tackle this question, the analysis presented here
has considered two diﬀerent types of supply curves, one with lower average cost —
74
i.e. the majority of the new entrants operate at a cost comparable to that of existing
actors — and one where new entrants operate at higher costs, as can be seen on
Figure B-1.
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(a) Cost distribution of actors with a lower
average cost (case with mostly low cost
entrants).
0"
20"
40"
60"
80"
100"
120"
0" 50" 100" 150" 200"
Co
st
%o
f%s
up
pl
y%
($
/t
on
ne
)%
Supply%(tonnes)%
(b) Cost distribution of actors with a
higher average cost (case with noticeably
more costly entrants).
Figure 4-3: Schematic representation of the costs of all the actors — existing and new
entrants — that have been used in the analysis.
The analysis itself consisted in changing the required delay during which the price
should be high enough to cover total costs, before fully entering the market. Three
cases were implemented, one with a one year delay, one with a three years delay
(the observed average) and one with a five years delay. The results for both cost
distributions are shown below.
There are several interesting points raised by the simulations depicted above.
First, it is interesting to notice that shorter delays in mine openings lead to
a reduced “undersupply”, in the sense that the actual production is more capable
of staying in line with the desired demand — represented by the dotted lines —
when mines can open more quickly. This illustrates the concept of greater flexibility
introduced when mines can make quicker decisions about opening.
On the other hand, the cost structure has a great influence on the results, as can
be seen on Figure 4-6. In particular, when in the case depicted by Figure 4-3b, the
price changes are more noticeable, since the new entrants operate at higher costs —
hence when there is a short opening delay, prices have a greater volatility because of
the diﬀerences in costs that lead to greater changes in price. Since a shorter opening
delay leads to a quicker entry of new actors, price changes are of greater magnitude.
In eﬀect, the simulations at large entry delay times illustrate a new entrant’s rationale
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(a) Supply and demand curves with a one
year delay before opening.
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(b) Supply and demand curves with a three
years delay before opening.
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(c) Supply and demand curves with a five
years delay before opening.
Figure 4-4: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 3% demand
growth rate and a moderate elasticity, with the cost structure depicted on Figure 4-3a
(mostly low cost entrants case).
for taking a longer time to enter the market. Even in a growing market, a new entrant
can find that a too-intemperate entry can actually depress the market price, adversely
eﬀecting profitability and, potentially, financial viability of the new mine. A more
conservative entry strategy leads to a more stable (and higher) price, and a more
reliable cash flow.
Finally, we can notice that overall price trends do not vary significantly when
delays change, especially when the market structure is that depicted on Figure 4-3a.
As pointed out in Section 3.4.2, the treatment of stock and the fact that demand is
exogenous lead indeed to a less reactive price adjustment when there is an “chronic”
undersupply. One could argue that, in reality, prices in the case of longer delay might
increase a bit faster due to the fact that the actual production is below the desired
consumption — or the driving force of the market. The trends observed, however, are
still in line with what we can expect if opening delays were longer, since the increase
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(a) Supply and demand curves with a one
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0.00#
50.00#
100.00#
150.00#
200.00#
250.00#
2009# 2010# 2011# 2012# 2013# 2014# 2015# 2016# 2017# 2018# 2019# 2020# 2021# 2022# 2023# 2024# 2025#
Su
pp
ly
&(t
on
ne
s)
&
Supply#2#3#years#delay#
Demand#2#3%#growth#rate#
(b) Supply and demand curves with a three
years delay before opening.
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(c) Supply and demand curves with a five
years delay before opening.
Figure 4-5: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 3% demand
growth rate and a moderate elasticity, with the cost structure depicted on Figure 4-3b
(noticeably more costly entrants case).
in price appears more stable, emphasizing the idea that entering too quickly, even in
a growing market, tends to increase price volatility. It may hence be more strategic
for a new entrant to adopt a more conservative strategy of entry.
4.1.2 Influence of Structural Characteristics of the Demand
When a manufacturer relies on a material, not only is it important to assess the supply
reliability, but the relative importance of the sector within the global demand is also
an important factor. One can easily imagine that, if a disruptive event such as a price
peak or a supply disruption occurs, the impact on a given demand sector will only be
greater if that sector represents a large portion of demand.
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Figure 4-6: The price evolutions obtained by the model with a 3% demand growth
rate and a moderate elasticity, with three diﬀerent mine opening delays.
Impact of a Demand Sector Leaving the Market
The following analyses have been designed to evaluate the impact on the overall market
of a demand sector dropping out.
In particular, two scenarios were implemented: one with a large sector dropping
out of the market, hence leading to a larger fall in the demand, and one with a small
sector leaving the market.
Such circumstances may arise in particular if technological changes take place in a
demand sector, leading to material substitution and a shift away from the material —
one could think for instance of the case of platinum and automotive manufacturers
shifting progressively towards a greater use of palladium as a substitute in catalytic
converters — or if new regulatory constraints on imports are put in place.
The conditions of the analysis are the following:
- The market is moderately concentrated (HHI = 20%)
- The demand is moderately elastic and grows at a 3% rate within each sector
- There is no recycling stream
- The demand disruptions have been implemented as taking place during over a
year (hence four quarters) or abruptly over only a quarter.
- The cost structure of the suppliers is that depicted on Figure 4-3a.
Several points are raised by these simulations.
First, the size of the sector leaving the market has a very clear impact, as expected.
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(a) Supply and demand curves with an
abrupt drop in demand.
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Figure 4-7: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 3% demand
growth rate and a drop of a small demand sector (10% of global demand).
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(a) Supply and demand curves with an
abrupt drop in demand.
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Figure 4-8: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 3% demand
growth rate and a drop of a large demand sector (30% of global demand).
What is perhaps more interesting is that, in the case of a large sector as shown on
Figure 4-8, there is a period with over -supply following the drop in demand. This is
mainly due to the stock resulting from the sudden fall in demand. Indeed, suppliers
cannot react immediately to a fall in demand, partly because of the delay in price
adjustment, but also because a mine cannot close immediately and will keep supplying,
even if it is at a loss, since the fixed costs are so high.
Then, the prices follow an expected trend that is that they fall very quickly after
the drop in demand, hence leading to an ultimate dip in the supply curves that can
be observed in particular on Figure 4-8. The prices then ramp progressively back
up, in order to give suppliers an incentive to fulfill the orders. Interestingly, when
a demand sector drops out, the re-adjustment of the market is more progressive,
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Figure 4-9: The price evolutions obtained by the model with a 3% demand growth
rate and a moderate elasticity, when either a large or a small demand sector leaves
the market.
since the mechanisms to reduce production and potentially close mines because of
over-supply take more time.
Finally, the impact of a more or less abrupt fall in demand is mainly noticeable
when looking at prices. Indeed, when the loss in demand is more progressive, the prices
tend to decrease slightly more slowly than in the case of an abrupt drop in demand.
The impact on supply is less noticeable, but we can still note that, on Figure 4-8b, the
supply increases back again a little bit earlier than in the case of an abrupt change in
demand.
These simulations are interesting particularly in the case of critical materials, since
substitution and technological changes can lead to such situations, where a sector will
progressively — or more abruptly — abandon a material to shift to a material that
may have a more reliable supply stream for instance.
Impact of the Entrance of a New Demand Sector
Conversely, what is the relative impact of a new sector entering the market? Recent
technological developments in diverse sectors of the economy are more and more reliant
on critical materials, and hence the demand for some materials may diversify in a
relatively short period of time.
The following analyses study the case where a new demand sector of moderate
elasticity enters the market, and have implemented a case where the sector is a small
new player and a case where the new entrant is a large player.
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The conditions of the analysis are the following:
- The market is moderately concentrated (HHI = 20%)
- The demand is moderately elastic and grows at a 3% rate within each sector
- There is no recycling stream
- The demand disruptions have been implemented as taking place during over a
year (hence four quarters) or abruptly over only a quarter.
- The cost structure of the suppliers is that depicted on Figure 4-3b.
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(a) Supply and demand curves with the
abrupt entry of a new demand sector.
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Figure 4-10: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 3% demand
growth rate and the entry of a small demand sector (about 10% of the new global
demand).
0"
50"
100"
150"
200"
250"
300"
350"
400"
2010" 2011" 2012" 2013" 2014" 2015" 2016" 2017" 2018" 2019" 2020" 2021" 2022" 2023" 2024" 2025"
Su
pp
ly
&(t
on
ne
s)
&
Supply"1"HHI"="20%"
Demand"1"3%"growth"1"large"sector"enters"
abruptly"
disrupFon"
(a) Supply and demand curves with the
abrupt entry of a new demand sector.
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Figure 4-11: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 3% demand
growth rate and the entry of a large demand sector (about 30% of the new global
demand).
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Figure 4-12: The price evolutions obtained by the model with a 3% demand growth
rate and a moderate elasticity, when either a large or a small demand sector enters
the market.
Several points can be made in the case of a new entrant, with these simulations.
First, there is a clear impact of the entry of a new actor, whether large or small,
on price. Indeed, prices rise almost immediately when a new demand sector is created,
which can be explained by a sudden undersupply that needs to be fulfilled by new
suppliers that are not yet on the market — hence the relative delay in the raise in
supply.
An abrupt entry — as opposed to a more “progressive” entry spanning over a
year — has the eﬀect of raising prices slightly more quickly. A resulting eﬀect, visible
especially on Figure 4-11 when a large sector enters the market, is the impact on
demand, since its elasticity leads to a slightly bigger dip following the increase in price
when that increase is more abrupt, i.e. on Figure 4-11a.
Finally, the magnitude of the impact depends on the size of the new entrant, as
could have been expected. The price increase is significantly larger when a large
demand sector enters, since it stimulates the production of a significantly larger amount
of material.
Critical materials markets have been exposed to similar situations especially these
past decades. Indeed, recent developments, particularly in the field of renewable energy,
have created new demand on already constrained markets. From these simulations,
it is clear that the impact on existing actors is very important, since the prices can
increase significantly in a relatively short period of time; such disruptive events on the
demand-side can hence be harmful. In particular, since the demand increases, more
costly suppliers enter the market, and the increase in price hence becomes durable.
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4.1.3 Influence of Diﬀerent Policy Decisions
Critical materials are important to many diﬀerent sectors of the economy, but also to
actors outside the market. In particular, public and private stakeholders exterior to
the primary market may have an incentive to intervene on the market and promulgate
policies that will ultimately an impact on the market itself.
The Impact of Mining Regulation
Mining practices in the case of critical elements can sometimes have a very large impact
on the environment and on the labor force. The case of REEs in China illustrates this
issue very well, since the excessive mining practices have led to a rapid degradation of
the surrounding environment as well as raised issues concerning the workforce.
While certain critical minerals’ markets are not yet well-regulated, it can reasonably
expected in the future that more stringent regulations be put in place.
Some environmental regulations result in a fixed-value increase in the marginal
cost of production; this however only leads to a global raise in the cost structure.
What may be more interesting is the case where the energy consumed is regulated — a
carbon-tax would have this eﬀect for instance — or overhead labor is more stringently
looked at. Then in eﬀect, the change that can be observed is the steepness of the
marginal cost curve: a more stringent regulation would lead to a steeper marginal
cost curve, hence making the production of each additional unit increasingly more
expensive.
To that end, the following simulation studies the case where a large supplier has a
more or less shallow marginal cost curve — as defined by the elasticity of the marginal
cost curve at the “optimal” production quantity, and this in three diﬀerent scenarios
where the market is non-concentrated, moderately concentrated and very concentrated,
as indicated by the Herfindahl Index.
The conditions of the analysis are the following:
- The market presents three diﬀerent supply concentration (HHI = 15%, HHI =
20% and 25%) but the overall amount of material available is equal.
- The demand is moderately elastic and grows at a 4% rate within each sector
- There is no recycling stream
- The marginal cost elasticity in the case of a lax environmental regulation is
equal to 1% of that for a stringent policy, for the largest actor.
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(a) Supply and demand curves with a rel-
atively lax environmental regulation.
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Figure 4-13: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 4% demand
growth rate and an non-concentrated market (HHI = 15%).
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Figure 4-14: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 4% demand
growth rate and a moderately concentrated market (HHI = 20%).
These simulations illustrate the fact that a more stringent regulation will lead to
an increase in prices, as can be observed on Figure 4-16.
It is interesting to note that concentration accentuates this phenomenon and
amplifies the magnitude of price increases. Moreover, a higher market concentration
leading to higher price peaks, the price elasticity of demand leads to large oscillations
in price — and in demand, as can be seen especially on Figures 4-14b and 4-15b.
A higher market concentration hence increases the volatility of the market, but less
stringent regulations for a large actor tend to mitigate the eﬀect of concentration, at
least in the medium-term.
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Figure 4-15: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 4% demand
growth rate and a concentrated market (HHI = 25%).
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(a) Price evolutions for a non-concentrated
market.
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(b) Price evolutions for a moderately con-
centrated market.
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(c) Price evolutions when a concentrated
market.
Figure 4-16: The price evolutions obtained by the model with a 4% demand growth
rate and a moderate elasticity, when a large supplier is exposed to a more or less
stringent regulation for mining.
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The Eﬀect of Recycling
The markets for PGMs are characterized by a well-established recycling stream, in
particular within the automotive industry. In her PhD dissertation, Alonso (2010)
argues that recycling has a risk-mitigating eﬀect on materials’ markets and tends to
in particular mitigate price excursions.
This next analysis has been designed to evaluate the relative impact of recycling
on a market where there is a supply disruption due to a large actor dropping out of
the market for a year — in the same conditions as in Section 4.1.1 above. Here, it has
been decided to only aﬀect the recycling rate of the largest demand sector (automotive,
in the case of platinum, that represents about 40% of the total demand), knowing
that the average lifetime of a product in this sector is of about 15 years. This lifetime
has also been modified in one of the analyses to evaluate its relative impact.
The conditions of the analysis are the following:
- The market is moderately concentrated (HHI = 20%).
- The demand varies among sectors, is moderately elastic and grows at a 4% rate
within each sector.
- A supply disruption of a year has been implemented, modeling a large supplier
(30% of the overall supply) leaving the market momentarily.
- The values 0, 5 and 20% have been used as recycling rates for the largest demand
sector.
- The average lifetime of a product within this sector is on average of 15 years,
but has been changed to 5 years in the last simulation.
From these simulations can be drawn several interesting insights.
First, it can be noted that recycling does have a mitigating impact on the market,
since on Figure 4-18 we can see that, as the rate of recycling increases, the impact of
the supply disruption is minimized and the price excursion is not as dramatic. This
hence confirms the results proposed by Alonso (2010).
Then, it is interesting to note that a 5% recycling stream does not have a very
significant impact on the market when a disruption of this magnitude occurs. This
hence illustrates the need for a well-established and eﬃcient recycling stream when
facing the possibility of largely disruptive events.
The product lifetime does have an impact on the market — although it is not
highly noticeable — since we can see that the prices are slightly lower when there
is a shorter lifetime and the supply disruption is somewhat smaller. This can be
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(a) Supply and demand curves with no
recycling stream and a 20-year product
lifetime.
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(b) Supply and demand curves with a 5%
recycling rate and a 20-year product life-
time.
0.00#
50.00#
100.00#
150.00#
200.00#
250.00#
2009# 2010# 2011# 2012# 2013# 2014# 2015# 2016# 2017# 2018# 2019# 2020# 2021# 2022# 2023# 2024# 2025#
Su
pp
ly
&(t
on
ne
s)
&
Supply#2#20%#recycling#
Demand#2#4%#growth#rate#
disrupCon#
(c) Supply and demand curves with a 20%
recycling rate and a 20-year product life-
time.
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(d) Supply and demand curves with a 20%
recycling rate and a 5-year product life-
time.
Figure 4-17: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a 4% demand
growth rate and a year long supply disruption from a large actor.
explained by the fact that demand is growing, hence 20% of demand 5 years prior to
the disruption is higher than 20% of demand 15 years before.
From these analyses, it is clear that an eﬃcient recycling stream mitigates the risks
of price excursions, by adding an additional supply stream that is not only dependent
on price. It can hence be a policy that manufacturers may want to pursue if the
cost of recycling is not prohibitive and the supply is forecasted to present a risk of
disruptions.
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Figure 4-18: Price evolutions resulting from the diﬀerent recycling scenarios in a
supply disruption case.
4.2 What can be Gained from the Model as Opposed
to Metrics-Only Approaches
While metrics are often used by manufacturers to make a purchasing decision about a
material, they cannot always reflect the market dynamics that have an influence on
the market. Hence a metric could indicate a source of concern, but market dynamics
and the inclusion of other parameters defining the context may lead to a situation
that is not as critical as expected, and vice versa.
This section presents cases where a metrics-based approach can be improved by
the use of market dynamics that incorporate feedback relationships between supply,
demand and price, and hence provide a more comprehensive insight on the market
and the criticality of materials.
4.2.1 The Case of Market Concentration
One of the main sources of worry in the case of critical materials today is the structure
of the supply. Indeed, physical constraints and high barriers to entry have led to
sometimes highly concentrated markets where the supply lies in the hands of only a
few actors that may belong to even fewer private organizations.
A relevant metric to look at when evaluating the risks of supply concentration is
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the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that has been defined in Section 2.3.1 of this
thesis. This metric is designed to evaluate the relative concentration of the market at a
given point in time. It is hence inherently static, and only accounts for the individual
suppliers and their relative importance.
The following analysis compares two markets that overall dispose of the same
quantity of material, but have very diﬀerent supply concentrations as defined by their
HHI. Those markets have been constructed by considering a “base” market that is
relatively fragmented (HHI = 15%), and changing the standard production quantities
(Q⇤) to increase the size of large producers and decrease that of smaller actors. The
resulting market can be considered as highly concentrated, with HHI = 25%. This
stylized analysis has been designed to compare the impact market concentration has on
a market, and in particular how market concentration interacts with demand growth
and leads to more or less ‘critical’ situations.
In order to evaluate the dynamic impact of market concentration, two scenarios of
demand have been modeled, one with a low growth rate of 2% and one with a high
growth rate of 6%.
The general conditions of the analysis are the following:
- The two markets produce the same quantity overall, but have a diﬀerent HHI at
a same point in time.
- The demand is moderately elastic and grows at a 2% and a 6% rates
- There is no recycling stream
The model outputs, namely supply and price, are presented below:
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(a) Supply and demand curves in a non-
concentrated market.
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centrated market.
Figure 4-19: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a low demand
growth rate and two cases of market concentrations.
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Figure 4-20: Price evolutions with a low demand growth rate, in the case of a
non-concentrated market and a highly concentrated market.
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(a) Supply and demand curves in a non-
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(b) Supply and demand curves in a con-
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Figure 4-21: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model with a high
demand growth rate and two cases of market concentrations.
While an HHI value of 25% or over is widely recognized as a sign of high con-
centration and hence high supply risk, the simulations shown above clearly indicates
that it is not always a source of concern and should not systematically discourage a
manufacturer to use the material. In particular, several insights can be gained from
these analyses.
The first observation that can be made is that, in both cases, a more concentrated
market leads to a higher price. This comforts the idea that, in general, a more
concentrated supply will lead to a more constrained market and influence the price of
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Figure 4-22: Price evolutions with a high demand growth rate, in the case of a
non-concentrated market and a highly concentrated market.
the resource, and ultimately impact manufacturers.
The case of a 6% annual demand growth rate strikingly illustrates this risk. Indeed,
the price evolution for a highly concentrated market is significantly above that of a
non-concentrated market, and more importantly the price volatility is notably larger
when HHI = 25%. And that characterizes what a manufacturer may consider as a high
risk, since price instability and resulting supply variations can have a great economic
impact on a firm that relies on a material and is moderately elastic. Moreover, such
short-term instability significantly impairs firms’ ability to make decisions about a
material, and the uncertainty greatly impairs the planning process, which is a crucial
aspect of manufacturing processes. Such results confirm that a high HHI exposes a
manufacturer to greater risk.
What is perhaps even more interesting is the fact that, when demand only grows
at a 2% annual growth rate in this case, concentration does not really present a high
risk anymore. While prices are very slightly higher in the case of a more concentrated
market, the overall behavior of the market and the supply do not present disruptive and
unstable behaviors; the resulting uncertainty is significantly lower and manufacturers
hence do not have to face a risk comparable to that of the high growth rate case.
What can be gained from such an analysis is the fact that, while metrics can be
informative from a general point of view, they are not suﬃcient to properly evaluate
the overall behavior of the market, in particular its instability. On the contrary,
it appears that, in this case, the criticality aspect of the market — namely the
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supply concentration — is highly dependent on the demand behavior and on the
interactions between supply, demand and price. Those interactions could not be
captured by metrics; manufacturers can hence benefit from using a model such as
the m:5 model that oﬀers a more comprehensive assessment of market dynamics and
complex interactions, taking into account an array of parameters that can influence
market behaviors. The case of growth rate has been chosen in this case, but the
impact of market concentration on the market as a whole could also be impacted by
factors such as demand elasticity, price-setting decision-making or public policies, for
instance.
4.2.2 The Impact of Price Sensitivity of Demand
Another aspect of markets that cannot be easily taken into account by static metrics
is the notion of feedback, and in particular the idea that demand is also sensitive to
supply and price evolutions. The economic concept of elasticity is a useful abstraction
to analytically understand the extent to which a price change aﬀects demand. Yet
elasticity values are not observable per se. Instead, they can be inferred from revealed
preference studies, by looking at how the consumption reacted to prices over time for
instance.
The m:5 model has been designed to account for demand elasticity and adjust
demand scenarios to supply and price changes, hence incorporating a dynamic feedback
in the market behavior. It is particularly interesting to adopt a manufacturer’s point
of view and evaluate the impact of other sectors’ behaviors on the overall market,
especially when supply is constrained and leads to price volatility.
The following analyses have been designed to evaluate the impact of price elasticity
of diﬀerently-sized demand sectors. Using the case of the platinum market, the demand
has been split into five diﬀerent sectors that have diﬀerent sizes and price sensitivities.
The price sensitivities of two diﬀerent sectors — one representing 10% of the total
demand and the other 30% — have been changed, while the market exposed to the
same demand growth rate, in order to compare the mitigating or worsening eﬀect of
price sensitivity on price levels and volatility.
The general conditions of the analysis are the following:
- The market is moderately concentrated (HHI = 20%).
- The demand sectors grow at a 4% annual rate.
- There is no recycling stream
92
Price&Sensi*vity&
Low$ High$
Fr
ac
*o
n&
of
&C
on
su
m
p*
on
&
Sm
al
l$
La
rg
e$
Industrial 
goods 
Other 
Electronics 
Jewelry 
Automotive 
(a) Original demand sectors distribution.
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(b) Demand structure with an increased
price sensitivity for a small sector.
Price&Sensi*vity&
Low$ High$
Fr
ac
*o
n&
of
&C
on
su
m
p*
on
&
Sm
al
l$
La
rg
e$
Industrial 
goods 
Other 
Electronics 
Jewelry 
Automotive 
(c) Demand structure with an lowered
price sensitivity for a large sector.
Figure 4-23: Three diﬀerent price sensitivity/sector size distributions of demand
sectors to see the impact of price sensitivity on the overall market behavior.
- The jewelry (30% of total demand) and industrial goods (10% of total demand)
demand sectors are shifted from a low to high price sensitivity while the others
are maintained at a moderate elasticity.
The model outputs, namely supply and price, are presented below:
These simulations provide diﬀerent insights concerning the eﬀect of price sensitivity
on the market. In particular, the following remarks can be made.
When the price elasticity of a relatively small sector (in this case, representing only
10% of the global demand) is changed, the eﬀect on both supply and price are not
particularly noticeable. Supply, price and demand curves present similar evolutions
in both cases — although a slight delay can be observed in the case where the price
elasticity is high. In particular, if prices follow a similar pattern in both cases, as
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(a) Supply and demand comparing the
two cases where a small sector has a low
or a high price sensitivity, as shown on
Figure 4-23b.
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Figure 4-24: The supply and demand curves obtained by the model when varying
price sensitivities as indicated on Figure 4-23.
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(a) Price evolutions in the two cases where
a small sector switches from a low to a high
price sensitivity, as shown on Figure 4-23b.
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Figure 4-25: The price curves obtained by the model when varying price elasticities as
indicated on Figure 4-23.
illustrated on Figure 4-25a, the higher elasticity slightly postpones the price peaks.
When the price sensitivity of a large sector — such as jewelry in the case of
platinum, representing 30% of the total demand — is changed however, the eﬀect on
the market is much greater.
On the one hand, Figure 4-24b clearly illustrates the fact that demand is more
elastic to price, since the demand curve in the case of a high price sensitivity presents
more variability. As a result, the supply curves also present slightly diﬀerent patterns.
On the other hand, the price curves on Figure 4-25b are particularly illustrative of
the eﬀect of price sensitivity on the overall market. More specifically, if a large sector
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has a high sensitivity to price, it will lower its demand when price increases and hence
lead to a price decrease. As illustrated on that figure, this leads to a higher price
volatility, since the sector is more reactive to price changes and impacts the general
price level due to the large size of the sector.
The simulation illustrates the fact that a manufacturer’s welfare also depends on
other consumers’ behaviors. Depending on several parameters such as size and growth
rate, the impact of higher prices may lead to diﬀerent market dynamics and ultimately
to more or less important price volatilities.
Using the case of the platinum market, the fact that the jewelry sector — repre-
senting a large fraction of the annual demand — has a high price sensitivity, as has
been historically observed, can have the eﬀect of increasing the price volatility on the
market. While there is a positive short-term eﬀect on other manufacturers since prices
decrease when demand for jewelry is lowered, the overall behavior of the sector and
its reactivity to price changes actually may increase the risks for other manufacturers
by making the market less stable.
The case of price sensitivity is also a good illustration of what can be gained from
using the m:5 model, instead of metrics-based approaches only. Incorporating market
dynamics and interactions between supply, demand and price refines the insights on
markets, and in particular can help decision-makers assess when a market characteristic
is indeed a source of concern — in this case a high elasticity demand sector creates
high price volatility, but only if the sector is large relatively to the rest of the demand.
4.3 Policy Implications of Materials’ Criticality
This section explores the policy implications of materials criticality, in light of the
methods developed and modeling results obtained.
To understand the policy context of the question of criticality, it is important to
revisit the original question. The importance of thinking about criticality from a
firm’s perspective is that the instability and uncertainty that can arise from critical
materials markets can have great economic implications not only for firms, but also for
suppliers and external actors — such as governments. Yet, conventional analyses have
tended to focus on the implications of such issues for the economy as a whole. This
section hence oﬀers a more comprehensive outlook of the policy landscape surrounding
the market for critical materials.
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The Structure-Conduct-Performance framework applied to critical materials mar-
kets in Section 2.1.3, illustrated the concept that markets are influenced not only by
their primary actors, but are also shaped by external factors such as that of govern-
mental policy, and hence have wider policy implications. The following sections use
components of this framework to comprehensively suggest and evaluate the diﬀerent
types of policies — whether private or public — that can be implemented, as well as
their possible limitations.
While supply disruptions and price volatility are primary manifestations of what is
usually characterized as materials criticality, price volatility information alone does not
aﬀord suﬃcient insight for the task of devising an eﬃcient mitigating policy. Moreover,
some of the current rules of thumb for both evaluating and treating materials criticality
— such as a focus on market concentration — are potentially too simplistic in both
conception and implementation when the market system as a whole is taken into
consideration. It then becomes important to establish the circumstances under which
such concerns are legitimate in order to avoid unnecessary policy interventions.
The risk-assessment and mitigation process thus has to be decomposed in diﬀerent
phases, namely to understand (a) whether or not there is a risk, (b) what the magnitude
and the consequences of that risk are, and (c) what types of action can be taken
in order to mitigate the eﬀects of the risk, or lower the risk, if possible. The tools
developed in this research have been designed to accomplish those tasks.
A particularly interesting feature of the model is that it aims at understanding
what the price actually means in the context of critical materials, as well as how this
understanding can help guide the decision-maker towards achieving the policy goal of
all market actors: surviving by making the largest profit possible.
Using a decision tool such as the m:5 model is particularly relevant when rec-
ognizing that market circumstances continuously evolve and that individual actions
have a broader impact on the market as a whole because of market dynamics and
interactions. Policy-making in the context of critical materials markets should be done
in an adaptive way; the use of a model such as the m:5 model, incorporating dynamics,
is hence valuable in the pursuit of this goal. An individual decision-maker can use
the model to (a) know what to monitor on the market, and (b) compare the diﬀerent
policies that can be eﬀective or not with the diﬀerent circumstances surrounding the
market, and this on a regular basis.
Given the constraints arising from the ways in which risks have to be assessed in the
case of critical materials, this section suggests and assesses risk-mitigating strategies
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that the diﬀerent market actors — namely suppliers, consumers and policy-makers —
can implement, using model insights and reflections on critical materials’ markets.
4.3.1 Policies to Influence the Supply Market Structure
Historical events, reinforced by model simulations, have shown that several structural
characteristics of materials’ markets present ineﬃciencies that ultimately can lead
to higher risks of supply disruptions and price excursions: the number of suppliers
on the market, the barriers to entry, and the cost structure of the diﬀerent actors.
This section aims at giving ways in which market actors may influence the structure
of such markets to mitigate the risks associated with the structural ineﬃciencies of
materials’ supply.
Addressing the Issue of “Natural” Market Concentration
One of the most important concerns on the supply-side of materials markets is
the influence of high market concentration on market eﬃciency. Mining markets
are characterized by very constrained supply structures, arising from (a) physical
constraints due to the geographic distribution of resources and (b) high investment
and capital requirements. Supply concentration can lead to more substantial price
excursions during periods of rapid growth in demand, as has been seen in the case of
palladium presented in Section 2.2 and in the results of model simulation presented in
Section 4.2.1 for instance. While concentration cannot systematically be considered
as a structural market characteristic, especially if the monopolistic or oligopolistic
positions of certain suppliers have been acquired through a particular conduct, this
section only considers cases where market concentration arises due to the natural
distribution of resources.
Policies that can be adopted in the case of a “natural” mono- or oligopoly are
limited however, because of the very nature of the problem.
Private actors, particularly suppliers and consumers, may have an incentive to
intervene to mitigate the eﬀects of a “natural” mono- or oligopolistic situation on
the market, rather than try to correct the situation itself. In particular, recycling
appears to be an eﬃcient policy, since adding a secondary supply stream to the
primary production can have a risk-mitigating eﬀect — particularly in the case of
supply disruption — as observed by Alonso (2010) and shown by model simulations.
Interestingly, the amount of material that can be recycled at each period depends
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on past consumption and not directly on supply nor supply structure — though one
could expect price to influence the rate of recycling, providing a more or less attractive
incentive to develop a sustainable and eﬃcient recycling stream.
For manufacturers, improving recycling can be a beneficial policy for additional
reasons. In particular, increasing the recyclability of material or making the recycling
process more eﬃcient has a positive influence on the sustainability aspect of the
material, which can be interesting in particular if regulations encourage the use of
secondary material.
An important aspect to consider when implementing a recycling policy is the notion
of timeframe. Indeed, materials can only be recycled once the products they were
embedded in reach their lifetime. Such lifetime may be diﬃcult to forecast and hence
it becomes diﬃcult for manufacturers to evaluate precisely how large the secondary
supply will be at a given time. Moreover, the eﬃciency of recovery highly depends on
the products the material was used in, as well as on the process required to recycle
and re-condition the material so that it can be used again.
Another important question arising when considering the implementation of a recy-
cling stream is that of who should take on the recycling process. While manufacturers
have definite advantages to encourage recycling policies in order to stabilize supply
and prices, and potentially improve the material’s sustainability impact, the cost of
recycling may be prohibitive or the facilities to accomplish a sustainable recycling
stream too capital-intensive. On the other hand, suppliers may have an incentive
to undertake recycling operations as well; if the recovery process is compatible with
mining and processing processes, it can be beneficial to increase revenues by providing
a secondary supply stream.
Enforcing a more eﬃcient recycling stream could also be undertaken by governments
when there is a risk of price excursion or volatility.
Using the model to estimate the adequate recycling rate may prove useful to
implement the most eﬃcient strategy, while considering the associated cost to the
industry or external recycling companies.
Alternatively, a policy that can be adopted by manufacturers to mitigate the eﬀects
of price instability or supply unreliability is that of stockpiling the material needed for
their projected demand. By buying material in advance, it ensures a constant price
for a given period of time, hereby stabilizing the supply stream and expected value of
the material.
The risks associated with such policies is that of large potential financial losses if
the material devaluates over time. Moreover, if many manufacturers adopt this policy,
the sudden demand increase may lead to an increased instability and higher prices
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as a result of the additional pressure on supply. Such negative eﬀect of “safety stock”
policies have been observed during the palladium crisis, as mentioned in Section 2.2
and can have a dramatic eﬀect on the economy.
The Issues Associated with Barriers to Entry
Another structural issue of critical materials markets is that of high barriers to entry.
The mining industry is highly capital-intensive and, even if a large deposit of the
material is found, it can be extremely expensive to open a new mine, not only because
of equipment and infrastructure, but also because of the very steep learning curve that
makes it harder for new actors to penetrate the market when there are established
actors already operating that have acquired eﬃcient mining techniques and knowledge.
An example is that of REEs: China has been the major producer of REEs for over 20
years and has acquired a very broad and deep knowledge concerning the mining and
processing of those materials, since the government had made the mining of REEs
a national priority (Program 863, 1986). Other nations with natural deposits need
to promote the procurement of this knowledge by their indigenous firms in order to
rapidly become competitive at a cost comparable to the current market price.
Governments of consuming countries can put in place policy strategies to lower
those barriers to entry, and hence allow for new actors to enter the market.
On the one hand, direct subsidies can be provided to prospective suppliers in order
to lower the financial requirements for the opening of a new mine. The risks associated
with such policies however are the financial risk if the prices of the materials fall before
the mines are able to reach a sustainable supply level, as well as possible Stiglerian
regulatory capture (Stigler 1971) by aﬀected industries and mining groups that could
create institutional ineﬃciencies. However it can be urgent to quickly diversify the
sources of supply of some critical materials, and subsidies or favorable tax regimes can
help achieve that goal in order to at least get the mines to a good functioning level.
On the other hand, governments may decide to fund research for the development
of the mining industry in order to lower the barriers to entry that have to do with
knowledge requirements. As mentioned in the previous section, the broad impact of
REEs on many diﬀerent industrial sectors for instance would motivate governments
to subsidize that industry (Busch 1999). Little risk is associated with such a strategy
that can benefit the overall competitiveness of a nation when the material considered
is very strategic.
Such decisions can be informed by the use of a model such as the m:5, since it
provides guidance to evaluate the extent to which the entrance of a new actor will
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mitigate the criticality risks, and what the required cost level might be. The user
should however acknowledge the fact that the m:5 model is currently designed to
perform qualitative analyses, and that its quantitative aspect may be refined by further
modeling developments, as suggested for instance in Section 3.4.3.
The Impact of Cost Structure
Finally, the cost distribution of the suppliers is another feature of market structure
that can have a great impact on market behaviors. This has been illustrated with the
model in Section 4.1.1, where we show that price volatility is dramatically influenced
by the scale and eﬃciency of the marginal producers. If those producers are both
small and costly, then small demand changes can lead to major price swings. A direct
consequence of higher costs is of course higher price levels, which can have a dramatic
impact on manufacturers if demand increases.
One avenue for suppliers to mitigate this eﬀect would be policies promoting tech-
nology change, particularly technologies improving mining and extraction eﬃciencies.
More eﬃcient mining techniques will lower the costs of extraction and ultimately lead
to increased rates of extractions and possibly lower price levels. Suppliers have an
incentive to lower their operating costs since it increases their marginal profit as well
as helps maintain the prices at a lower level and hence limiting the entry of new actors.
Distortions may be introduced when promoting such policies however; in particular,
more ‘aggressive’ pricing policies may lead to non-competitive market behaviors, as
will be mentioned in Section 4.3.2. The case of REEs is an extreme illustration of
such a distortion, yet one would not expect in general that technology changes would
systematically lead to monopolistic behaviors.
The shape of the aggregate supply curve has large policy implications for suppliers;
indeed, price evolutions are directly influenced by suppliers’ extraction costs, which has
an eﬀect on profitability and production decisions. Policy implications for suppliers
are related to extraction choices — more specifically, cost levels of operating suppliers
have a direct impact on individual mines, and may encourage either a higher or a
lower rate of extraction. It can even lead to the closure of a mine, if prices are driven
down too far.
More generally, the cost structure of suppliers may have a large impact on the
overall behavior of the market. In particular, simulations have shown that various
operating cost levels as well as marginal cost curve steepness may lead to significantly
diﬀerent price evolutions, and governments of supplying countries may consider that
helping the suppliers to become more cost-eﬃcient can help the overall economy.
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Busch (1999) would argue that, in the case of REEs for instance, their importance
for many diﬀerent industrial sectors for instance would justify the establishment of
subsidies for that mining industry.
On the one hand, favorable tax regimes and subsidies for existing mines can change
the shape of the aggregate supply curve and as a result lower the risks of supply
disruption and price volatility. Using the m:5 model can prove useful for governments
to establish the levels of subsidies or taxes to put in place in order to have a significant
risk-mitigating impact on the market.
On the other hand, one could envision the establishment of transfer payments
between consuming and supplying countries to favor a change in the shape of the
aggregate market supply curve and hence lower the risks to the economy and consumers.
Distortions may arise from such a policy, if the recipient country does not use the
payment to its intended end.
4.3.2 Policies to Aﬀect the Supply Market Conduct
Many manifestations of criticality arise due to the conduct of suppliers. This section
seeks to present ways in which private as well as public actors may influence the
conduct of critical materials markets actors, to mitigate the risks associated with the
ineﬃciencies of materials’ supply.
Tackling Market Concentration Resulting from Suppliers Conduct
First, market concentration can result from a particular conduct. In the case of REEs
for instance, the monopolistic position of China has been acquired not only because
of a particularly large reserve of inexpensively extractable materials, but mostly from
the adoption of a very aggressive mining strategy coupled with a certain laxity in
accounting for environmental damages. Discovered in 1787, significant production of
REEs only became important around 1965, and dramatically increased in 1985 when
China started large-scale production. This is mainly attributed to the implementation
of the Program 863 in 1986. According to China’s Ministry of Science and Technology,
that program was created to “gain a foothold in the world arena; to strive to achieve
breakthroughs in key technical fields that concern the national economic lifeline and
national security; and to achieve ‘leap-frog’ development in key high-tech fields in
which China enjoys relative advantages or should take strategic positions in order to
provide high-tech support to fulfill strategic objectives in the implementation of the
third step of China’s modernization process” (Program 863, 1986). As a result, a lot of
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money was directed at the mining and processing of REEs that appeared very strategic
at that time. While the world demand was significantly increasing as more and more
uses for those materials were discovered, China became better and better at mining
them, increasing their output while driving prices down significantly. As a result, other
suppliers — including American companies that were market leaders beforehand —
were driven out of business (Hurst 2010) because of a lesser eﬃciency in the extraction
and processing of the materials. This led to the monopolistic position that is still
unchanged today. Moreover, large environmental costs are associated with the mining
of REEs. For instance, the exploitation of Mountain Pass’s deposits lead to thorium
tailings, whose disposal is expensive. The Chinese government has been fairly lax — at
least until recently — in the enforcement of most relevant environmental regulations,
hence helping to cement a dependency upon the Chinese supply by undercutting
competitors.
Governments first have a possibility of directly sanctioning the monopolistic
behavior of the supplier. In the case of REEs, it seems very plausible that the quotas
and other policies impairing exports were designed by the government in order to favor
the competitiveness of China. If true, this behavior could lead to the presentation
of a case at the WTO, with sanctions are a potential result. Using an international
organization such as the WTO in order to regulate and control the behavior of a market
actor behaving in a way that impedes competition can help mitigate the negative
eﬀects on the market. However recent developments have shown that this is not an
easy or rapid process and seems to be slowed down by bureaucratic issues. Indeed,
Japan, the United States and the European Union jointly brought a dispute case to the
WTO in March 2012, regarding China’s policy concerning the rare materials’ supply
(China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications
for the United States 2012). The WTO agreed in late July to consider the claim and
verify whether or not China is constraining exports in order to favor its domestic
production in a non-competitive way, but no actual measures have been taken as of
today, however.
Another policy would be that of international coordination. In a monopolistic
situation, all the countries rely on one single nation whose mining industry can be
very much controlled by its government — in the case of both REEs and palladium,
for instance. In order to mitigate the risks, the importing countries need to coordinate
their demands and together find arrangements in order to ease the pressure on the
supply side; hence Japan establishing a new import contract with Kazakhstan for
instance.
If international coordination is key in such situations, it is however insuﬃcient to
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fully mitigate the risks because it does not solve the fact that most of the supply cannot
come from other places, at least not in the short-term. But common claims and import
policies can help add pressure on the monopolistic supplier and accelerate the process
of establishing competition. Such policies might however lead to an Olsonian collective
action dilemma (Olson 1984) since the issue of a critical material’s supply can aﬀect
many countries and the chosen common action might not be in the best interest of the
actors; diﬀuse interests and concentrated costs of accomplishing increased coordination
and fruitful negotiation among actors may not lead to an socially optimal outcome.
One could also envision the creation of an international stockpile to mitigate the
impact of generalized supply disruptions; however, this policy would require an even
greater amount of coordination and raises many issues in terms of where the stock
should be located, how it should be split between actors, how it should be regulated etc.
There are hence many challenges associated with greater international coordination.
Using the m:5 model to compare several scenarios of disruptions and their impact
on the market — due to a high market concentration — can help governments make
decisions as to which of the aforementioned strategies to adopt given the market
context characteristics.
Private actors, particularly suppliers and consumers, may also have an incentive
to intervene to mitigate the impact of a mono- or oligopolistic situation.
A natural strategy to accomplish this goal would be supporting activities that
would lead to the development and introduction of new mines that have the potential
to operate at a comparable cost and produce a significant amount of material. The
impediment to the implementation of such policies is the high cost of opening a mine,
though high prices as well as a high demand for the material can provide a good
enough incentive to encourage the opening of new mines. Public policies, such as tax
credits to favor exploration (i.e., an investment tax credit), accelerated depreciation
of operating mines (i.e., a depletion allowance or tax credit) or the development of
information collecting activities that would lower the cost of discovery (such as the
USGS) could be put in place to reduce the impediments to such policies. As mentioned
earlier, distortions may arise due to a possible regulatory capture by private actors for
instance. One could expect the overall benefits of diversifying supply sources to be
larger than the risks associated with it, however. A tool such as the m:5 model may
prove useful in evaluating whether the benefits of investing in such strategies are large
enough to justify such interventions.
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Addressing Asymmetric Information
Another aspect of critical materials’ markets that arises from actors’ conduct is the
asymmetry of information. The case of palladium and the Russian stockpile is one
example of such asymmetry and the palladium crisis is an illustration of the type of
risk that can arise from this market imperfection.
Consumers can be directly impacted by this market imperfection, since the asym-
metry of information arises when one or several suppliers have an incentive to limit
the information about their production or their stock. There are several policies that
can be envisioned to remediate the eﬀect of asymmetric information on consumers.
First, private actors such as consulting firms can be hired and paid to report
financial information about the operations of diﬀerent mines. While mines are usually
required to publish annual financial reports, private companies may be able to obtain
more thorough data through established partnerships with mining companies, and
can hence be hired by manufacturers.
Asymmetric information can often lead to an unreliable supply stream, hence
giving manufacturers an incentive to also establish a stockpile in order to mitigate the
eﬀect of potential disruptive events in the supply chain. Such strategies had been put
in place during the “Palladium crisis” as seen in Section 2.2 and proved particularly
risky since the value of the stock exhibited very high volatility. If a price collar or
another type of policy protecting against price volatility can be put in place, or if the
value is not expected to change too drastically, stockpiling can still be an interesting
risk-mitigating strategy for consumers to insure a reliable source of supply.
Alternatively, another policy that could be adopted by consumers is that of
substitution, which would imply a change in the technology design. Such a strategy —
which will be further discussed in Section 4.3.3 — can be very costly for manufacturers
and not always feasible, if the functionality constraints imposed by the product cannot
easily be met with a diﬀerent material (as discussed in Section 2.1.2).
On the other hand, suppliers themselves may have an incentive to mitigate the
potential supply unreliability resulting from asymmetric information. Indeed, the
resulting risk premium on price may well lead to lower demand for the material.
Policy decisions that can be made by suppliers to mitigate such disruptive events —
that are for the most part unpredictable — may include business decisions such as
the establishment of long-term contracts with manufacturers. This was done by the
Russian government in the context of the palladium crisis, in order to ease the market.
Indeed, insuring a reliable supply stream for a period of time spanning over several
years reduces the uncertainty surrounding the market and hence limits price volatility,
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which can be harmful both to suppliers and manufacturers. There are potential risks
associated with such a policy, in particular for manufacturers if the contract is binding
but technological changes occur, or if prices vary too much — in either direction —
from their value of when the contract was established.
Finally, governments may also have an incentive to gain more information about
the supply of the material, if the resource is deemed important for the country’s
economy, as has been presented in Section 2.2 and is summarized below.
First, governments may encourage the opening of a new domestic mine — if the
reserves exist — in an importing country, since possessing a domestic source of an
expensive commodity can prove very strategic. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the
American government adopted that strategy by favoring the expansion the Stillwater
mine. The up-front costs required for such a policy are large, yet its cost-eﬀectiveness
can be evaluated through the use of the m:5 model, since the model can provide
insights on how valuable a new mine will be on the current market to mitigate the
risks encountered. Investing in an existing mine if the costs are deemed too high could
be a less-costly alternative that would still enhance the strategic positioning of the
importing country. Such an investment might be politically challenging to justify for
public actors, but could be undertaken by private companies.
Finally, governments may also encourage the establishment of regular market
reports, to enhance the knowledge of the industry. Structures such as the USGS
provide regular outlooks on commodities, but usually in a way that is too focused
on the short-term and may not be directly usable by firms to make better decisions.
Comprehensive reports with longer-term considerations, for instance through the
creation of an international third-party structure, may improve the data available to
manufacturers to help make better-informed decisions, especially if used in conjunction
with a modeling tool such as the m:5 model.
The Issue of Rent-Seeking and Regulatory Capture
Diﬀerent policies that can be put in place to mitigate the risks associated with critical
materials markets may lead to rent-seeking behaviors that can be particularly harmful
for markets (Krueger 1974). For instance, the creation of a stockpile for a strategic
material may lead to rent-seeking behavior that would undermine the eﬃciency of the
mitigating policy. This issue has also arisen in the case of REEs for instance, with the
establishment of export quotas and the hold put on Japanese exports. Such behavior
could potentially be mitigated through the use of transfer payments. Indeed, the main
reasons put forward by the Chinese government for the implementation of stricter
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quotas is the domestic environmental impact of mining; one could hence envision
transfers from importing countries in order to compensate for those externalities and
reduce the pressure added on the market. Yet other factors are certainly at stake,
including the need to save REEs for domestic production, as well as possible political
conflicts that may not be easily solved via transfer payments.
Related to the notion of rent-seeking is that of regulatory capture. According to
Stigler (1971), firms may have an incentive to encourage governmental intervention in
order to limit the entry of new actors in the market as well as establish tariﬀ regulations.
In particular, if the commodity is important for a large portion of the economy of
a country, it can lead the government to undertake important regulatory actions,
subsequently increasing the risk of regulatory capture by the industry. Similarly,
existing mines may have incentive to encourage tightened mining regulations since it
may drive up costs and concomitant barriers to entry, hence limiting competition.
4.3.3 Influence of Public Policy on the Consumers Side
Several policies can also be developed to aﬀect the consumers’ side of the market,
particularly if the material is of strategic importance to diﬀerent stakeholders or that
there are security externalities associated with its extraction and use.
Strategic Importance of the Material
As mentioned in Section 2.1, critical materials can be of significant importance to
numerous actors of the economy, both private and public.
The core challenge of materials criticality for manufacturers is, of course, the
reliance of the product and the resulting production strategy on reliable availability of
a critical material. For instance, a car manufacturer is directly impacted by a supply
disruption in the PGMs’ markets since there is a heavy use of precious metals in
catalytic converters.
Manufacturers need to make decisions about materials on a regular basis, and
hence forecast their future need for a given material depending both on the design and
production requirements, and on the supply stream reliability. As model simulations
— as well as historical trends — show, higher rates of demand lead to greater risks
of supply disruptions and resulting price excursions. Comparing diﬀerent demand
scenarios and evaluating their relative impact on the market, in order to assess the
best use of materials in product design hence becomes an important policy aspect for
critical materials’ users.
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If a material’s market appears to present a high risk of supply disruption or price
excursion, a manufacturer can hence adopt diﬀerent types of policies to mitigate
the eﬀects of criticality on itself. One can be the adjustment of the demand for
the material, so as to lower the reliance on the material. This can be accomplished
through the elaboration of a diﬀerent product design that does not use as much
material. Another possibility, which is often adopted, is that of material substitution.
Section 2.1.2 has raised the question of functionality constraints and the trade-oﬀ
between material’s performance and cost that needs to be evaluated by manufacturers,
in order to make more comprehensive decisions about materials and product design.
In particular, these policies are better informed by the incorporation of supply-related
information about materials. The main risk associated with such polices are that of
cost, since changes in product design as well as finding feasible alternatives may be
challenging for manufacturers.
The strategic importance of critical materials and the impact they have on several
industries could also lead governments to develop risk-mitigating strategies addressed
directly to consumers.
First, creating a domestic stockpile of the element in order to sustain the country for
a long period of time could greatly increase security of supply and insure a continuous
production of manufactured goods using the material. There is however a financial risk
associated with it since the material might get devalued because of market fluctuations,
as mentioned in Section 4.3.1. Yet, if there is a high risk of price volatility — arising
from diﬀerent circumstances and informed by the implementation of diﬀerent scenarios
in the m:5 model for instance — having such a stockpile for domestic manufacturers
would stimulate the industry without impairing the economic health of firms.
It could however increase the risk of a Stiglerian regulatory capture by industries
that are in need of a specific material, since those interest groups would benefit from
regulations favoring their own industry through subsidized raw products, as compared
to others that may not need the same materials (Stigler 1971). One could hence argue
that such an insurance policy should only be implemented if the material has an
impact on industries that have a strategic role in the domestic economy; this relates to
Busch’s discussion (Busch 1999) about national champions since it raises the question
of whether or not governments should favor certain industries as opposed to others.
A perhaps more radical strategy would be that of material substation since the
model shows that lower demand reduces the risks of disruptions and price volatility.
Governments could in particular fund research and development to mitigate the risks
coming from the functionality constraints that lead a specific industry to rely heavily
on a particular material. For instance, one could envision federally funded research on
107
permanent magnets to lower the reliance on REEs, since they are the only economically
and technically viable option to reach the level of magnetism to sustain wind turbines
operations, and yet are inherently highly critical due to their constrained supply.
Security Externalities
Critical materials can also have strategic implications in that they are often times
heavily used in industries that supply national security infrastructures and technologies,
such as military equipment. The government influence is hence not that of simply
mitigating risks, but rather the addition of a new demand sector. It can hence be
important to use a model such as the m:5 model, in order to compare the eﬀect of
the addition of a governmental demand sector to the market and evaluate the relative
impact of growth rate and elasticity, before making purchasing and deployment
decisions.
Additionally, security externalities may arise because of where the material is
mined. The nature of the mining industry is such that the distribution of supply
sources depends upon geological properties. As a result, countries with limited or
inexistent natural deposits are mostly reliant on imports to procure the necessary
commodities for industry actors — private or public.
Security risks such as labor or political unrest in supplying nations may add
frictions on the market and have a negative impact on the supply chain for the
material, potentially leading to disruptive events. Such events can be harmful to
markets, as was the case with the recent strikes in South Africa as mentioned previously
in Section 2.3.2, but also violate domestic or international rights. The Dodd-Frank
Act (2010) is an example of policy that governments may adopt to mitigate such
externalities. By labeling gold, tantalum, tin and tungsten as conflict minerals because
extracted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the political unrest
is great, the U.S. government insured that its domestic manufacturers would limit
contracts with suppliers from the DRC and hence limit the negative impact of the
externality on the American economy. Such policies present the risk of aﬀecting
domestic production, since it directly constrains the supply stream and may result in
increased procurement costs — if for instance new (and more expensive) mines are
required to satisfy the demand.
Mitigating the negative eﬀects of security externalities may also require interna-
tional coordination, especially if the geopolitical situations of the supplying countries
are against international regulations such as those of the WTO. Yet international
coordination also presents limits, as mentioned in Section 4.3.2.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
In a economy that increasingly relies on materials for productivity and new energy
sources, it is essential to be able to make informed purchasing and design decisions
when it comes to material use. While some materials markets are well-established and
regulated, and hence can sustain the demand with a reliable stream of supply, others
exhibit constrained behaviors that can emerge from many diﬀerent sources. Materials
become critical when the supply unreliability or price volatility become too risky for
a manufacturer, given his own demand.
The review done of current approaches to criticality shows that existing approaches
are inadequate to the challenges faced by firms making decisions about materials.
On the one hand, static — or metrics-based — approaches are useful in that they
quickly and easily provide an overview on the market. However, their static nature
limits their ability to reflect the interactions between supply, demand and price, and,
thus, runs the risk of overlooking their potentially mitigating or risk-enhancing eﬀects
on the market.
As illustrated in Section 4.2, metrics can be misleading when indicating a source of
concern — such as market concentration — since the impact of such market structures
upon the market is dependent on the entire context.
As a result, while metrics provide a good way of quickly screening for potential
risks on a material’s market, they are not suﬃcient to grasp the full picture and, thus,
make a well-informed decision about a material.
Although static approaches are limited, it is also the case that the current dynamic
approaches to criticality do not necessarily provide the flexibility and insights required
for manufacturers to make decisions about materials.
First, while economic abstractions are useful to reflect on markets in general and
long-term market trends, they do not provide a short- to medium-term approach to
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criticality that would help manufacturers make a decision about a material in a timely
fashion. Moreover, most of the economics literature exploring the issues of criticality
has used as its unit of analysis the economy as a whole. Thus, conclusions of such
analyses speak to the actions necessary to sustain and maintain that economy. What
has been missing, however, is an approach that takes the firm as the unit of analysis,
which is a challenging thing to do because of the amount of specificity (treated by
financial models) and detail (addressed by system dynamics models) required to obtain
meaningful insights.
Financial-based models are restrictive in the sense that they focus on very short-
term reflections on market and rely on regression-based forecasts to infer either demand
or supply, and hence are lacking the notion of feedback and a longer-term perspective
that is necessary for firm operational planning.
System dynamics models oﬀer the most comprehensive overview of materials’
markets and incorporate a large number of actors, behaviors and trends. As a result
however, the time and resources required to build such models for one individual
material make it diﬃcult for manufacturers to gather enough information about all
necessary materials and make informed decision in a timely fashion.
This gap in the existing literature and work on materials criticality led to the
current research eﬀort, which was focused on the development of a tool that could be
easily used by manufacturers to make quick, yet suﬃciently well-informed, decisions
on diﬀerent materials.
One of the questions motivating this work can be summarized as follows:
To what extent is it feasible and beneficial to adopt the tools of microeconomic theory
to get new insights into the dynamics of materials availability?
An adaptive tool was developed to model materials markets and provide insights
about mining economics to manufacturers. The model, fully explained in the text
and appendices, has been grounded upon economic theory, and is framed as a supply-
demand model. It also draws on observations of mining markets to incorporate
common imperfections, and implements a market pricing strategy that was deemed
most suitable.
While the m:5 model has limitations, results and analyses show that it is a useful
tool to advance understanding of market dynamics and behaviors, while while making
limited data requirements of the analyst. Such an approach thus appears both feasible
and beneficial, since — as shown in Section 4.2 — it can inform decision-makers better
than static metrics, and has the advantage of being both tuned for manufacturers and
requiring only a limited amount of data.
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A second question motivating this work was:
In the context of critical materials, how can a better understanding of market dynamics
inform criticality assessments and risk-mitigating strategies?
To answer this question, many scenarios were developed and simulated using the
model. Chapter 4 (a) presents some of the obtained results, (b) identifies potential
sources of concern — and associated contextual parameters — for manufacturers, and
(c) oﬀers risk-mitigation strategies.
Two key findings of these analyses revealed that subtle interactions among materi-
als markets structure lead to important contingencies that must be explored when
considering criticality risks. First, while market concentration is widely viewed as
increasing the risk of unexpected price excursions in critical materials markets, these
eﬀects are only significant under circumstances when consumption is expanding rapidly
(i.e., high demand growth rates). Second, the structure and composition of demand
must be taken into consideration when exploring criticality risk. Diﬀerential price
elasticities of demand, in conjunction with the overall market shares of consuming
sectors, have a strong influence on the apparent volatility of a materials market.
Moreover, some mitigation strategies have been identified in this work.
First, recycling has the eﬀect of reducing price excursions and mitigating severe
supply disruptions. The eﬃciency of recycling has a large impact on the mitigating
eﬀects of this potential strategy.
Second, the model analyses confirm that new mine openings can be beneficial to
reduce the market concentration and hereby mitigate disruptive events on the market.
Yet this benefit is only apparent under the contingencies as mentioned previously, for
instance under circumstances where consumption is increasing rapidly.
Finally, policies that change the cost curves of mines, for instance regulation or
subsidies, have a great impact on the market behavior. Scenarios should hence be
developed and implemented in the model to compare the relative eﬀect of these policies
on the market and evaluate their benefits versus their costs.
This work has produced and tested a tool designed so that manufacturers and policy-
makers can make better-informed market decisions about materials. By modeling
market dynamics and allowing for the implementation of diﬀerent demand scenarios,
this tool enables a decision-maker to compare the relative impact of various policies
on a materials market. Since the model does not require a large amount of inputs, it
is flexible enough to be used for many diﬀerent materials, and in a timely manner.
Assumptions about markets behavior and model simplifications — for resource
constraints — have been made, and limit to some extent the model’s applicability to
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every situation. During the development of the model, we identified a trade-oﬀ to
assess between an increased model complexity — and concomitant increased accuracy
— and the resources needed to (1) implement it and (2) apply it to diﬀerent materials.
Since the motivation of the work was to provide a flexible tool that incorporates
market dynamics but can easily be used by firms on a short-term basis for planning
requirements, this trade-oﬀ has led some simplifying assumptions. The following
section hence makes suggestions for possible improvements and extensions of the tool,
based on the observations of its limitations, pointed out in Section 3.4.2.
Future Work
Design choices made during the development of the m:5 model present limitations
that could be reduced in future model developments. In particular, these modeling
implementation decisions limit the utility of the model when seeking to construct
reliable quantitative forecasts. As has been described in this document, the focus
of the model development was, instead, upon constructing a tool whose theoretical
foundation would facilitate the development of useful scenario analyses and the
insightful evaluation and comparison of qualitative market features for decision-makers.
However, should an analyst have on hand greater supply and demand information than
the m:5 model requires, there are several opportunities for model refinement what
would help to improve the model’s suitability for the exploration of more quantitative
results.
One of the main assumptions of the model is related to the handling of stock.
The current model treats the stock as a simple bookkeeping instrument, with a very
simple strategy, when material stocks are in fact held by a variety of actors pursuant
to a variety of strategies, almost all of which are driven by short term price changes.
Instead, in the m:5 model, stock is aggregated at each period and is virtually “sold” —
as an additional supplier — at the next period. One improvement could hence be to
make the decision of selling the stock price sensitive, and hence incorporate the notion
of opportunity costs and investment. Speculation and investment are indeed important
aspects of critical materials markets, since they may exacerbate price excursions by
increasing demand when prices are higher and increasing supply when prices fall
down — for profit-making reasons. Incorporating such behavior in the model could
increase the sophistication of the price level calculation; making the selling of stock
price-sensitive could be an insightful first improvement to that end.
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Similarly to stock, recycling is handled simplistically. Indeed, the m:5 model does
not yet consider that recycling is actually a function of all the material on hand, in that
any material not recycled but still on hand could be recycled in the future. Instead, the
current model assumes that only some fraction of material found in products produced
exactly one (average) product lifetime ago in the past is systematically recycled at
a given rate. While an average recycling rate and an average product lifetime for
each sector are a legitimate assumption given the complexity of the recycling stream
and the underlying decision-making process, one could envision as a first step the
introduction of a price sensitivity for recycling. The recycling industry appears indeed
to be highly dependent on materials’ prices and on the eﬃciency of the recycling
process, and it could be insightful to capture this notion of opportunity cost when
handling recycling.
The current model introduces new mines in a deterministic fashion, set in size and
capacity and introduced according to a price trigger. A more sophisticated treatment
could model a stochastic implementation of exploration and discovery. In particular,
higher prices tend to lead to higher exploration eﬀorts and hence to the opening
of additional supply sources. While the list of potential new mines is currently an
exogenous input of the model, it could be made endogenous and non-deterministic.
This would further enhance the coherence of the discovery side of the model, by
making use of observational data (developed by the USGS for instance) that suitably
parametrizes the theoretical framing of it.
Finally, the price-setting mechanism that has been put in place follows a given
rationale, but one could think about exploring other market maker strategies that
reflect diﬀerent market microstructures, such as pure trades, contracts-based markets,
cartels, etc. For each material, there are specific various real institutions whose
behavior is monitored and regulated, and whose structures are likely not strictly
identical. Hence, one could envision the implementation of some flexibility in the
way for the market-maker chooses price at each period. While this can be done by
directly modifying the formula, it could also be made a model parameter and enable
policy-makers to make the price-setting mechanism more finely tuned to the specific
market considered.
The high flexibility of the tool, combined with the ease of use due to the spreadsheet
format, make it simple for users to tune it and adapt it to their needs. The underlying
theory provides a theoretical foundation that already provides good insight on materials’
markets, and can be built upon to obtain more refined results if desired.
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Appendix A
Constructing and Modeling Mining
Supply Curves
In this appendix, we will explain how we approached the construction of an aggregate
supply curve for the mining industry, given the diﬀerent limitations of traditional
methods we exposed in Section 3.1.
Discussion of the Conventional Economist Approach
The conventional profit maximization strategy for an individual firm is to produce
at the point where the marginal cost of production is equal to the price, assuming
that the firm is a price-taker and that the price is above the minimum average cost —
otherwise the firm would not enter the market (Nevile 1992–1993). Indeed, profit can
be defined in its most simple form as
⇧ = p · Q  TC(Q)
where Q is the production quantity, and TC(Q) the total cost of production. The
first derivative of this expression is equal to zero at the profit maximum, and hence
we have
MC(Q) =
@TC
@Q
= p
with MC the marginal cost at the optimal production quantity.
Moreover, the marginal cost curve of a firm intersects its average cost curve at its
minimum:
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AC(Q) ⌘ TC(Q)
Q
Hence,
@AC
@Q
=
@TC
@Q · Q  TC(Q)
Q2
= 0
iﬀ
@TC
@Q
= MC(Q⇤) =
TC(Q⇤)
Q⇤
= AC(Q⇤)
with Q⇤ the minimum of the average cost curve.
Since it is traditionally agreed that the average cost curve of an individual firm is
U-shaped, especially in the case of a mining industry, we can summarize these results
with the graph on figure A-1:
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Figure A-1: Schematic representation of individual average and marginal cost curves,
with Q⇤ the quantity at the minimum average cost and (Q1, P1) an example of
production level where profit is maximized.
Those considerations, however, are only applicable in the short run — long-run
supply curves have a diﬀerent shape, but for this work we do not need to consider
long-run supply curves. Indeed, long-run supply curves are by definition not price-
sensitive but instead are dependent on economy-wide contextual parameters, such as
employment levels. The scope of the model however, is focused on short- to medium-
term price-sensitive decisions by individual actors.
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Finally, if we consider a market where firms are heterogeneous, we can as a first
approximation aggregate the supply curve as figure A-2 suggests (Tilton 1992).
Cumulative Production
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Figure A-2: Aggregation of inhomogeneous supply curves following a stair-step ap-
proach.
On this graph, we have represented the aggregation of four diﬀerent supply curves
that we have horizontally summed, since we are considering private goods, while
ordering them by increasing minimum average cost. As illustrated on figure A-1, each
marginal cost curve intersects the average cost curve at its minimum. The way the
supply curve is usually derived is by simplifying the individual curves and modeling
them by “steps” (as shown on the graph A-1 by the arrow line). The width of the step
is determined by the total quantity that a supplier can produce up to its minimum
average cost. Conventionally, past that point, the supply curve — when aggregated
— becomes vertical until market prices rise high enough that the next supplier can
feasibly enter the market.
We argue, however, that this approach is limited in the sense that it does not allow for
a supplier to follow its marginal cost curve, which as we mentioned earlier maximizes
its profit, and to increase its production up to its overall capacity (symbolized on
graph A-1 by a star). The flat part of the step, in the conventional representation,
seems to impose a production and operating cost “ceiling” that is inconsistent with
the kind of flexibility that most firms have to increase working hours at times of
high demand. We will hence discuss how to get around this limitation in the next
paragraph.
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An Approach to Overcome the “Verticality Issue”
As we pointed out earlier, ending an individual supply curve by a vertical line, modeling
the impossibility of producing above the minimum average cost, does not allow for a
larger production that would be desirable despite the higher cost it represents. Indeed,
in order to maximize profit, suppliers tend to follow their marginal cost curve once
they have produced at least the quantity for which the average cost is minimal. Hence,
our modeling approach has been first, to allow suppliers to follow this marginal cost
curve until the next supplier enters the market — at least when assuming complete
information on the market — and, second, to shift the supply curve accordingly, since
there is additional production. The resulting curve is shown on figure A-3.
Cumulative Production
Co
st
AC1
MC1
AC2
MC2
AC3
MC3
AC4
MC4
New "step-curve"
aggregate supply curve
Figure A-3: Aggregation of inhomogeneous supply curves following a stair-curve
approach.
This time, past the minimum average cost, a supplier is able to “over-produce”
by following its marginal cost curve, which increases the total production of each
individual supplier. As a result, diﬀerent levels of demand will lead to a lower price
than the one that would have been obtained following the curve on figure A-2, since
the curve has shifted to the right.
Now it would be interesting to understand why we can consider that an individual
supply curve prior to the minimum average cost can be considered as flat, when
looking at it non-instantaneously.
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Reflections on the Flat Part of the Supply Curve
Realistically, firms cannot produce at a constant cost and have to follow their average
cost curve until its minimum. Hence, it seems that following a “step-curve” supply
curve is not accurate either. Instead, the real supply curve should be as shown below
on figure A-4.
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Figure A-4: Aggregation of inhomogeneous supply curves following the average and
marginal cost curves.
While on an instantaneous scale individual firms do have to produce following the
highlighted curves, such curves are actually unstable. Indeed, if we take the case of
the first supplier, he will have an incentive to keep producing following its marginal
curve until either the capacity is attained or the cost is equal to the average cost of the
supplier 2. But if that is the case, since supplier 2 has an incentive to enter the market,
he will at least increase his production so as to operate at the minimum average cost.
Because of this, the first supplier will have no incentive to produce above the second
supplier’s minimum cost, and will hence stop at the “step” previously described.
As a result, we have two cases at hand, depending on the demand level:
- If the demand intersects the marginal cost curve of the first supplier before the
latter meets the next average cost curve, then the second supplier does not enter
the market.
- If, however, the demand is above that intersection point, then supplier will have
an incentive to stop operating at the step, and supplier 2 will operate at its
optimal point — i.e. its minimum average cost.
Hence, when looking at supply curves at a non-instantaneous timescale, we can
model the supply curve with a “step-curve” approach since it is its stable state. The
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curve depicted on figure A-3 is thus relevant in the short run, for non-instantaneous
decisions, which is appropriate in our study.
120
Appendix B
Derivation of the Supply Curves and
Interpolation of Marginal Cost
This appendix explains how the individual cost curves were constructed and, more
specifically, how the inverse function of the marginal cost curve — used to calculate
the production at each period as presented in Appendix C — was implemented.
Modeling Design Objectives
The general design objectives of the model in terms of supply curve algorithms have
been as follows:
• The implementation of a relatively simple analytical functional form for the
supply curves that can still cover a wide range of behaviors in terms of supply
quantity and cost, while remaining easy to parametrize;
• Ensuring that the simulated average cost curves are U-shaped and have continu-
ous first and second derivatives; and
• To use a functional form so that the marginal cost curve can be easily inverted,
so that the level of production that a mine could achieve for a given price is
readily computable.
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Derivation of the Average Cost Curve
Following standard microeconomic assumptions, the average cost curve of each mine
was assumed to be ‘U-shaped’, with a clearly defined minimum. Mathematical
formulations satisfying this condition were employed to develop a general formula that
could be parametrized to reflect a wide range of operating conditions.
Condition on the Second Derivative
The very first analytic condition the general cost curve must meet derives from the
condition that the second derivative of the average cost curve should be positive when
average cost is at a minimum, so that the marginal cost curve is upward-sloping when
it intersects the average cost curve. Starting with the definition of marginal cost:
MC(Q) =
@TC
@Q
(B.1)
yet TC(Q) ⌘ AC(Q) · Q by definition
hence MC(Q) = Q · @AC
@Q
+ AC(Q) (B.2)
From the assumption stated above, the first derivative of the marginal cost should be
positive at Q⇤, the minimum average cost:
@MC(Q)
@Q
    
Q⇤
> 0
ie
@2AC
@Q2
    
Q⇤
+ 2 · @AC
@Q
    
Q⇤
> 0 (B.3)
By definition, @AC@Q
  
Q⇤ = 0. The condition is hence
@2AC
@Q2
    
Q⇤
> 0 (B.4)
While the condition given in Equation B.4 is only necessary at Q⇤, it can be generalized
to hold for the function generally, since it carries the desirable condition that the
average cost function is convex.
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Functional Form of the Average Cost Curve
The condition given in Equation B.4 on the second derivative, as explained in the
previous section, is the only condition required for initial modeling purposes. While
many functional forms can satisfy this condition, a pseudo-polynomial function fulfilling
the condition has been adopted, for it can be tuned depending on the mines and can
cover a wide range of production quantities and costs:
@2AC
@Q2
= a · Qn (B.5)
where a > 0 and n   0
Integrating Equation B.4 and using the following condition and formalism
@AC
@Q
    
Q⇤
= 0
and
AC(Q⇤) = A⇤
lead to
@AC
@Q
=
a
n+ 1
· ⇥Qn+1   (Q⇤)n+1⇤ (B.6)
and
AC(Q) =
a
n+ 1
·

Qn+2
n+ 2
  (Q⇤)n+1 · Q
 
+ A⇤ +
a
n+ 2
· (Q⇤)n+2 (B.7)
Total cost and marginal cost hence become
TC(Q) =
a
n+ 1
·

Qn+3
n+ 2
  (Q⇤)n+1 · Q2
 
+

A⇤ +
a
n+ 2
· (Q⇤)n+2
 
· Q (B.8)
MC(Q) =
a
n+ 1
·

n+ 3
n+ 2
· Qn+2   2 · (Q⇤)n+1 · Q
 
+ A⇤ +
a
n+ 2
· (Q⇤)n+2 (B.9)
Equations B.8 and B.9 yield an analytic form that can be used to compute total
and marginal cost for a mine, given appropriate parameters, over the entire range
of possible mine outputs. For modeling purposes, an explicit way of calculating the
inverse function of the marginal cost is required in order to be able to compute the
output of each mine at a given market price, which must be greater than or equal to
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each producing mine’s AC(Q⇤). Equations B.8 and B.9 are not generally invertible for
all n, so an approximation technique had to be devised. The next section will explain
how the inverse marginal cost function was modeled.
Inversion of the Marginal Cost Curve
In order to calculate the amount of product a supplier is willing to deliver at a given
price (assuming profit maximizing behavior), the suppliers’ marginal cost function
has to be inverted — the model can hence derive the production quantity of a given
supplier at a given price in order to calculate the total supply of the period, as
mentioned in Appendix A
The expression (B.9) is not easily invertible, hence the need to approach the inverse
marginal cost function. Moreover, a second order Taylor series approximation does
not fit the selected function well, as illustrated in Figure B-1. Since the upper limit on
production was a modeling parameter, a quadratic interpolation between the output
at which average cost was minimized and this upper limit on production (using one
intermediate point) aﬀorded a more suitable function. The graphs shown on Figure B-1
illustrate the fact that, given the functional form chose for the marginal cost curve, a
quadratic interpolation of the curve provides a better fit than a Taylor-series approach.
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Figure B-1: Illustration of the diﬀerences between a second-order Taylor series de-
velopment and a quadratic interpolation of the marginal cost curve. For both sets
of parameters shown in these figures, the interpolation approach leads to a better
approximation of the marginal cost curve.
The marginal cost curve was hence approximated as a polynomial expression of
the second order:
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gMC(Q) = a · Q2 + b · Q+ c (B.10)
such that gMC(Q⇤) = A⇤ (B.11)gMC(f1 · Q⇤) = MC(f1 · Q⇤) = M1 (B.12)gMC(f2 · Q⇤) = MC(f2 · Q⇤) = M2 (B.13)
with 1 < f1 < f2
This approach uses “generic” interpolation points (given by f1 and f2) since f2 is
also the factor defining the upper limit of production at each period as a multiple
of Q⇤. While producers are able to extract more material — at a higher cost than
the lowest average cost point — there is still a physical capacity constraint in the
short-term production (Tilton 1992).
In general, we rarely observe a mine operating at twice its rated production capacity,
but it can vary from mine to mine — a bigger mine may for instance be able to take
on a larger portion of “over”-production compared to a smaller mine that hence would
have a smaller f2. Those parameters have been made flexible, and can even vary over
time as the mine slowly depletes.
The three parameters a, b and c of the expression (B.10) can hence be derived,
since there are three equations — namely (B.11), (B.12) and (B.13) — and three
unknown parameters:
a =
1
Q⇤ 2
· 1
f2   f1 ·
 
M2   A⇤
f2   1  
M1   A⇤
f1   1
!
(B.14)
b and c can be inferred from this expression:
b =
1
Q⇤
· M2   A
⇤    f 22   1  · (Q⇤)2 · a
f2   1 (B.15)
c = A⇤   (Q⇤)2 · a Q⇤ · b (B.16)
Once those parameters implemented, the quantity produced at a specific marginal
cost of production can be easily inferred by using the Quadratic Formula, given the
expression (B.10) and the fact that we only want a positive production quantity:
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Q =
 b+pb2   4 · a · c
2 · a (B.17)
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Appendix C
Simulation Strategies
The simulation strategy employed in the dynamic market model is built upon the notion
that the market is driven by suppliers independently making production decisions
based on apparent price.
Calculation of production for operating mines
1. Start with a given price from the preceding time period, Pt 1
2. If Pt 1   A⇤i for the i-th supplier, compute the quantity the i-th supplier will
produce, MC 1(Pt 1), as illustrated on Figure C-1. Note that, because of
computational complexity, this inverse function is typically an approximation
(refer to Appendix C).
3. Sum over all suppliers to get the supply in the current period, i.e., for all i such
that Pt 1   A⇤i ;
P
iMC
 1
i (Pt 1) = St.
Price-setting mechanism adopted by a market-maker
A market maker with perfect knowledge of the supply curve could take this approach:
1. Given demand at time t, Dt
2. Find the cost at which ideal supply equals demand:
(a) Order the suppliers in ascending order of A⇤
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Figure C-1: Illustration of the calculation of production for period t. The total supply
at t is given by the sum of each MC 1i (Pt 1).
(b) Compute the “ideal” supply curve where every producer i will produce
MC 1(A⇤i+1) (i.e. up until the next step).
(c) Compare the quantity ideally supplied with the quantity demanded, by
minimizing the diﬀerence between the ideal cumulative supply and the
demand. The supplier that minimizes this diﬀerence is called the “cut-oﬀ”
supplier.
i. If the ideal supply of the cut-oﬀ supplier is less than the demand, then
the price is calculated as the A⇤ of the cut-oﬀ supplier plus a fixed
fraction of the diﬀerence between the minimum average cost of the
potential next supplier and the cut-oﬀ supplier, in order to encourage
a larger supply in the next period.
ii. If the ideal supply at the cut-oﬀ is above demand, then:
- If the intersection between supply and demand occurs on the step
of the cost curve of the cut-oﬀ supplier, then price is given by A⇤
of the cut-oﬀ supplier, to which we subtract a fixed portion of the
diﬀerence between that cost and the minimum average cost of the
supplier before him, in order to aim for a lower supply at the next
period.
- If the intersection between supply and demand occurs on the
marginal cost curve of the cut-oﬀ supplier, then price can be
calculated as equal to the marginal cost of the demanded quantity,
following that curve.
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3. Let each producer whose A⇤   Pt 1 and aﬀect to each a stock equal to the
diﬀerence between what they actually produced (as computed previously, only
given the preceding price), and what they should have ideally produced (i.e.
stopping when their marginal cost equals the minimum average cost of the next
supplier).
This price-setting mechanism is illustrated on Figure 3-4 in Section 3.2.2.
Consideration of the mines operating above the price
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the actual calculation of supply also includes producers
whose A⇤ is above the price but have been producing in the past and cannot close
directly, for more realism. This theory is explained below:
- If the mine is open, price is above marginal cost but the mine produced at a
loss in the last period, then the supply is increasing from its last level to the
optimal level with a factor tau1 :
Qt = Qt 1   Qt 1  Q
⇤
⌧
- If the mine is open but price is below marginal cost, the mine will produce at a
loss and decrease its production with the same factor tau:
Qt = Qt 1   Qt 1
⌧
In parallel, the model calculates a cumulative “loss” (sum of losses and benefits)
over a 4-year window when a mine is operating above the price, and if this cumulative
1The factor tau is calculated specifically for each mine and re-adjusted at each period. It is a
downward-sloping linear function of the diﬀerence between the minimum average cost A⇤ and the
current price. The equation is hence:
⌧ =
8><>:
⌧min if pt 1  x ·A⇤t 1
⌧max if pt 1   A⇤t 1
⌧min +
⇣
pt 1
A⇤t 1
  x
⌘
· ⌧max ⌧min1 x otherwise
with ⌧min = 1 for each mine (the value for which a mine will immediately shut down), ⌧max specific
to each mine, and x the lowest fraction of A⇤ the price can attain before a shut-down of the mine.
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loss exceeds a certain factor (specific to each mine) times the “optimal” revenue Q⇤ ·A⇤,
then the mine shuts down.
Finally, a process runs to monitor closings and openings of mines. In particular,
mines that have not yet opened will only operate after a certain number of periods
(monitored by the user on the inputs page) where the price is above its projected
minimum average cost.
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Appendix D
Description of the Demand Scenarios
This appendix explains how the model exogenously defines demand, how the user can
modify scenarios, and how a notion of feedback based on price elasticity is implemented.
First the general form used in the model will be described; the notion of price elasticity
is subsequently addressed.
General Form to Describe Demand Scenarios
The model implements demand scenarios through the individual description of diﬀerent
demand sectors. For each sector i, the model user can specify:
- The demand sector growth rate r (in %/year)
- The initial share of global demand ↵(i) (in percentage)
- A seasonal factor s that specific to each quarter (in %/year)
- Recovery information:
- Recovery rate (in percentage)
- Standard lifetime of a product in this demand sector (in years)
The model computes quarterly demand using the inputs of each sector. Each quarter’s
demand (Dt) is based on the demand in the preceding quarter (Dt 0.25), multiplied
by the growth rate (r) and the seasonal adjustment (st). For sector i, the recursion
equation is:
D(i)t = D
(i)
t 0.25 ·
⇣
1 + r(i) + s(i)t
⌘0.25
(D.1)
The initial demand by sector is defined as D(i)0 ⌘ ↵(i) · D0, where D0 is the total
demand for the material at t0.
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Modeling Price Elasticity
A standard economic metric of the price responsiveness of demand is the price elasticity
of demand, defined as the percentage change in demand (Q) for a one percent change
in price, or, more explicitly:
✏ =
@Q
Q
@P
P
=
@Q
@P
· P
Q
(D.2)
The model employs price elasticity to create a degree of price responsiveness in
what is otherwise a purely exogenous demand function. The functional form of the
responsiveness is quite basic, dependent upon how price compares to its historic level.
The model calculates a moving, weighted average of price over a number of periods T
— defined by the user — and adjusts demand depending on how the simulated price
compares to historic levels. The sector’s elasticity sets the impact of price changes
on demand and, as is the case for “conventional” goods, increased prices lead to a
lower demand and vice-versa. The weights wi are defined by the user and influence
the weighted average of the price to which the simulated price is compared.
When price is higher than its moving average, the model simulates the sensitivity
of demand to price with an exponential form, multiplying the period demand (Eq. D.1)
by the ratio of simulated price to the trailing weighted average of price raised to the
power of the elasticity:
D(i)t = D
(i)
t 0.25 ·
⇣
1 + r(i) + s(i)t
⌘0.25 · PtPt 1
j=t T wj · Pj
!✏
(D.3)
Since the elasticity is generally negative, we do obtain that higher prices lead to a
lower demand for that good.
On the other hand, when prices fall, demand will tend to increase; however using an
exponential functional form to increase demand was deemed too radical. Instead, the
model implements a linearization of the elasticity expression (D.2) to adjust demand
when the price is below its moving average, while insuring continuity when the price
ratio converges to 1. The moving average for demand is also weighted — the weights
are denoted xi.
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✏ =
D˜t
(i)  
t 1X
j=t T
xj · D(i)j
t 1X
j=t T
xj · D(i)j
·
t 1X
j=t T
wj · Pj
Pt  
t 1X
j=t T
wj · Pj
(D.4)
This resulting formulation of the final demand still incorporates the growth and
seasonal rates, while implementing an averaging approach; the resulting expression of
simulated demand is:
D(i)t = D˜t
(i) ·
⇣
1 + r(i) + s(i)t
⌘0.25·Pt 1j=t T xj ·(t j) (D.5)
where we substitute D˜t
(i) with its expression obtained from (D.4).
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Appendix E
Mine Expansion Theory
This appendix outlines the simulation framework developed to treat mine expansion
and related mine dynamics, implemented in the model.
Ore grade degradation
Ore grade can be expected to degrade over time as a given mine extracts more and
more material. Hence, one can expect that there will be a relationship between ore
grade g and cumulative production CP . As a working approximation, the model
assumes that this relationship is linear, and downward-sloping. The following graph
presents this relationship:
-
6
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHgmin
gi
g
CPKtot
↵
Ktot is the expected total output of the mine, as assessed by the investor when
opening the site. Both Ktot and gmin (the limiting ore grade, below which production
is not economically feasible—essentially the limit between resource and reserve) are
model inputs, and represent feasibility limits. ↵ is the absolute value of the slope and
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is given for each mine; similarly, gi is the grade of the ore extracted when the mine
opens.
With this framework, mines of diﬀering grades and operating lifetimes can be
simulated. Some working rules of thumb can be readily modeled using these inputs.
For small mines, assuming a smaller ore body, one would expect the g–CP line
to decline at a relatively more rapid rate, resulting in a steeper line, limiting the
opportunities for expansion. The following modeling rule has hence been adopted to
determine whether or not expansion is possible:
(
↵ > ↵¯ : no expansion
↵  ↵¯ : expansion
with ↵ the absolute value of the slope, representing the percent ore grade reduction
per unit of ore extracted.
The relationship between ore grade and cumulative production can be formulated
as follows:
g(t) =
8><>:
gi   ↵ · CP if g > gmin and CP (t)  Ktot
0 otherwise
Relationship between the average cost and quantity
produced
Let Q(t) be the quantity of the element that is mined at t, R(t) the quantity of matter
extracted at t. This provides:
8t, Q(t) = g(t) · R(t)
Let AC be the unit average cost of production. As a first approximation, AC can be
defined using the following expression:
AC(t) · Q(t) = R(t) · V C + capital
⌧life
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with V C the variable cost of extraction, and   = capital⌧life the capital invested initially,
discounted for the expected lifetime of the mine (again, from the investor’s point of
view). This expression becomes:
AC(t) =
V C
g(t)
+
 
Q(t)
(E.1)
If the variable cost of extraction is relatively constant over time and given an initial
rated production and minimum average cost, the variable cost can be calculated by
using Equation E.1 (where A⇤i is the initial minimum average cost ACi(t0), and Q⇤i is
the corresponding initial optimal production Qi(t0)):
A⇤i =
V C
gi
+
 
Q⇤i
i.e. V C = gi ·
 
A⇤i  
 
Q⇤i
!
There is now an explicit (and computable) relationship between AC(t) and Q(t), and
more specifically for our model, between A⇤ and Q⇤.
Expression for the optimal production Q⇤
Again, the model assumes a linear relationship — that can be either upward-,
downward-sloping, or constant — between Q⇤ and the cumulative production CP .
Instead of being defined by its slope, it will this time be defined by two points: initial,
and at Ktot (as envisioned by the investor).
-
6
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Q⇤i
Q⇤f
Q
CPKtot
Hence
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Q(t) = Q⇤i +
Q⇤f  Q⇤i
Ktot
· CP (t)
Now Q⇤f should be calculated. From the assumption that the investor envisions
a production at Q⇤(t) at each period, Q can be replaced by Q⇤. Moreover, CP (t) =R t
ti
Q(t)dt.
Deriving the expression for Q(t) once with respect to t, we obtain a first-order linear
diﬀerential equation:
@Q⇤
@t
=
Q⇤f  Q⇤i
Ktot
· Q⇤(t)
The solution is hence:
Q⇤(t) = Q⇤i · exp
 
Q⇤f  Q⇤i
Ktot
· t
!
Finally, at t = ⌧life, we have Q⇤(⌧life) = Q⇤f . The following equation provides a means
to calculate Q⇤f :
lnQ⇤f   lnQ⇤i
Q⇤f  Q⇤i
=
⌧life
Ktot
Using the function Goal Seek in Excel®, Q⇤f can be estimated numerically within
the model.
Derivation of the minimum average cost A⇤
Given the expression (E.1), A⇤(t) can be derived from the calculation of Q⇤(t) by
simply applying this formula to the point where the average cost is minimal, and we
hence obtain:
A⇤(t) =
V C
g(t)
+
 
Q⇤(t)
This mine dynamics approach is implemented in the model and is used to account for
mine expansion when running simulations over several years.
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